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Preface 
 
This PhD dissertation contains three essays within the area of regional 
economic modelling and, although each essay can be seen as an 
independent manuscript, they are linked to each other.  
The main purpose of the dissertation is to study regional development 
policy and regional adjustment mechanisms with the help of applied 
general equilibrium models.  
The first essay describes the building of a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) for Sardinia which provides the data set necessary for calibrating 
a general equilibrium model. Scarcity of information at a regional level, 
means that a well-defined SAM cannot be created using a simple 
compilation method. For instance, the lack of data on secondary 
distribution processs inhibits an accurate compilation of the sub matrix of 
transfers between institutions. This sub matrix is estimated by means of a 
doubly constrained minimum information (MI) model, originally 
developed by Plane (1982) and Schneider and Zenios (1989). In order to 
take account of measurement errors, I have introduced random noise into 
the MI model using the same method as Robinson et al. (2006) in a Cross 
Entropy (CE) model. Furthermore, the CE model is used to reconcile all 
the information employed and to introduce additional precisions in the 
estimation of some macro aggregates.   
The role played by knowledge capital as a factor of regional 
development is the topic of my second essay, “R&D Investment and 
External Knowledge Spillovers”. I present the model for Sardinia with an 
analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of policy promoting R&D. 
The model is a single-county dynamic general equilibrium model where 
agents have myopic behaviour. Contrary to other regional myopic models 
found in the literature, this model for Sardinia incorporates labour market 
imperfections and allows for total adjustment of labour and capital stock 
through migration and adjustment cost functions.  
The third paper is titled “Does the Forward Looking Model Fit the 
Regional Economic Features?”. Intertemporal forward looking models 
are usually calibrated on national data, however a slavish application of 
the characteristics of such models may cause some problems in a regional 
context since regions may differ from the country as a whole. It is argued 
that intertemporal consumers’ optimization based on neoclassical or 
Fisherian intertemporal resources allocation is inappropriate to the region 
since endogenizing the path of savings involves a balance of payments 
constraint, a constraint not faced by regions. Furthermore, I compare 
forward looking and myopic models. This comparison may be very 
useful since, in the literature, the intertemporal model has generally been 
compared to a simple static case lacking any capital adjustment rule. 
Contrary to previous exercises, we find that the only difference between 
the two models is in the transitional pathway where consumption and 
investment might diverge since agents with perfect foresight have 
 ii 
 
rational expectations, whilst those with myopic foresight take decisions 
according to adaptive expectations without making any intertemporal 
preferences between periods on future profit and income.    
The models contained in these essays are programmed in GAMS 22.8 
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Abstracts 
 
Essay 1: Constructing a Social Accounting Matrix for Sardinia. 
 
Recently, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) has been resurrected as a 
policy analysis tool and, in the last decade, attention has been paid to 
SAM multipliers, as well as to the use of the SAM as a benchmark for 
computable general equilibrium models. This paper constructs a SAM for 
the regional economy of Sardinia that can be used for policy evaluation 
and impact analysis. A mixture of approaches is used from simple 
compilation and decomposition methods to procedures for matrix 
estimations and matrix balancing. 
 
 
Essay 2: R&D Investment and External Knowledge Spillovers: an 
investigation of the impact of R&D subsidy on a recipient region in a 
computable general equilibrium model. 
 
In this paper we present a computable general equilibrium model for the 
region of Sardinia (Italy) with the purpose of evaluating the capacity of 
R&D policies to affect the long run rate of growth. The model 
incorporates induced technical change (ITC) obtained through knowledge 
accumulation, and external knowledge spillovers. It turns out that the 
cost of R&D policies may change according to the wage setting 
prevailing in the region. Furthermore, the capacity of such a policy to 
generate knowledge spillovers from the international and interregional 
trade is quite modest. Indeed, the capacity of the regional system to 
internalize the innovations embedded in the imported goods is partially 
offset by an increase in internal efficiency that lowers the spillover 
intensity through a reduction in the share of imports.  
 
 
Essay 3: An Applied Regional Intertemporal General Equilibrium 
Model: does the forward looking model fit the usual regional 
closures? 
 
We present a stylized regional intertemporal forward-looking model able 
to take into account regional economic features, an area that is not well 
developed in the literature. The main difference from standard 
applications is the role of savings and its implication for the balance of 
payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-looking behaviour for 
agents, the rate of private saving will be exogenously determined, and so 
no neoclassical financial adjustment is needed. Also, we focus on the 
similarities and the differences between myopic and forward looking 
models, highlighting divergences between the main adjustment equations 
and the resulting simulation outcomes.   
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Constructing a Social Accounting Matrix for 
Sardinia 
 
 
 
Abstract. Recently, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) has been resurrected as a 
policy analysis tool and, in the last decade, attention has been paid to SAM multipliers, 
as well as to the use of the SAM as a benchmark for computable general equilibrium 
models. This paper constructs a SAM for the regional economy of Sardinia that can be 
used for policy evaluation and impact analysis. A mixture of approaches is used from 
simple compilation and decomposition methods to procedures for matrix estimations 
and matrix balancing. 
 
 
 
JEL: C16, C67, E01. 
 
Keywords: Social Accounting Matrix, Input-Output, Doubly Constrained Minimum 
Information (MI) Model, Cross Entropy, Regional Account System. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper illustrates the mains steps used to build a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for Sardinia for the year 2001. The starting point is the 
Regional Input Output (RIO) Table for Sardinia built by IRPET
1
 
covering the year 2001 (see Table A1in Appendix). Data from the 
following sources were used to fill the sub-matrices of the SAM: System 
of Regional Economic Account, SRA (ISTAT
2
, 2006), Disposal Income 
Account (ISTAT, 2005), Italian Household Expenditure Survey (ISTAT, 
2001) and the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (Bank of Italy, 
2002). However, these sources are insufficient to obtain a well detailed 
SAM; a lack of data on the secondary distribution processes inhibits a 
proper compilation of the sub matrix of transfers between institutions. 
The latter is estimated by means of a doubly constrained minimum 
information (MI) model (Plane, 1982 and Schneider and Zenios, 1989) 
with the introduction of measurement errors. Furthermore, because of the 
mixture of sources we have employed, the resulting SAM is inconsistent, 
i.e., column totals differ from row totals. In addition, some figures of the 
RIO table are slightly different to those reported in the SRA. We can 
identify at least two reasons for this: regional account data published by 
ISTAT in 2004 may be slightly different from that published in 2006 
because ISTAT revises the series every two years; secondly, there could 
be problems caused by an adjustment process used to balance the RIO. 
                                                 
1
 Istituto Regionale per la Programmazione Economica della Toscana. 
2
 National Statistics Office (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica). 
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As a result, it is necessary to incorporate and reconcile the information 
derived from different sources to produce a consistent and well-defined 
SAM. To this end, the Cross-Entropy method (Robinson, Cattaneo and 
El-Said, 2001) is used to readjust the data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
structure of the SAM. Section 3 presents the main data sources, and 
section 4 describes the adjustment operations carried out on the RIO table 
so that it can be incorporated as part of the SAM. The analytical SAM is 
then developed. In section 5 we focus on the allocation of primary 
income to institutional sectors and the distributional transfers amongst 
institutions. Section 6 explains how Households are separated into 14 
income groups whilst section 7 is dedicated to the balance of payments. 
Finally, section 8 is devoted to the balancing method, and, in the last 
section, concluding remarks are offered. 
 
      
2. The structure of a regional SAM 
The SAM is a system of national/regional accounts (or even sub-regional 
accounts) in a matrix format. It includes the inter-industry linkages 
through transactions typically found in the IO accounts and the 
transactions and transfers of income between different types of economic 
agents, such as Households, Government, Firms and external institutional 
sectors (Rest of the World, ROW and the Rest of the Country, ROC). It 
has the following characteristics:  
• it should be a square matrix, in the sense that each account has 
its own row and a corresponding column; 
• for each account, the row total and the column total should be 
equal. 
 
The architecture of a stylized SAM is shown in Table 1. The first column 
is the total supply of commodities, given by gross domestic output (cell 
[1, 1], cell [2, 1] and [4, 1]), plus imports from the external sector
3
 (cell 
[5, 1]). The first row is demand for commodities for intermediate 
consumption in the production process (cell [1, 1]), for final consumption 
by the households and government ([1, 3]), investment (cell [1, 4]) and 
export (cell [1, 5]). 
The second column reflects payments or distributions of factor incomes: 
factor remuneration of capital and labour to domestic institutions (cell [3, 
2]) and foreign factor imports (cell [5, 2]). The second row gives the net 
value added (cell [2, 1]) which reflects the value newly created in the 
production process by the use of labour and capital and the factor income 
from the external sector (cell [2, 5]).  
                                                 
3
 As in this schematic representation of the SAM provided in table 1, the taxes and fees 
are not reported, the domestic output is valued at factor cost whilst the imports are 
valued free on board. Furthermore the external sector includes both the Rest of the 
Country and the Rest of the World. 
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The third column represents payments by institutions for commodity 
consumption or transfers of income to other institutions. That is, the total 
institutional expenditure in terms of final consumption (cell [1, 3]), 
transfers between institutions (cell [3, 3]) and savings (cell [4, 3]). The 
corresponding row represents receipts of income by institutions in terms 
of  factor payment (cell [3, 2]), transfers from domestic sectors (cell [3, 
3]) and from abroad (cell [3, 5]).  
The fourth row contains depreciation (cell [4, 1]), domestic savings 
(cell [4, 3]) and foreign and interregional savings (cell [4, 5]), and the 
column contains investment demand (cell [1, 4]) and government net 
debt (cell [3, 4]).  
Finally, the external sector account (ROC/ROW) shows the imports of 
commodities (cell [5, 1]), factor incomes to the external sector (cell [5, 
2]) and transfers of firms and government (cell [5, 3]). The column 
contains the export sales to ROC and ROW (cell [1, 5]), factor income 
transfers from abroad (cell [2, 5]) and foreign and interregional savings 
(cell [4, 5]).  
The SAM can also be seen as a general equilibrium framework where 
equality between production column and the row confirms that demand 
equals supply for all commodities; moreover the institutional row total is 
equal to the corresponding column total, showing that income is equal to 
revenue so that all domestic agents have demands that satisfy their 
budget constraints. Equality between ROC/ROW row and column 
provide the current-account balance.  
 
Table 1 - Stylized SAM 
 
  Production 
(1) 
Factors 
(2) 
Institutions 
(3) 
Accumulation 
(4) 
ROC/ROW 
(5) 
Production      (1) Intermediate 
inputs 
 Consumption Investment Export to 
ROC/ROW 
Factors           (2) Factors 
Payment 
   Factor 
Income from 
ROC/ ROW 
Institutions      (3)  Income to 
institutional 
sectors 
Transfer Government 
net Debt 
 
Transfer 
from 
ROC/ROW 
Accumulation  (4) Depreciation  Institutional 
saving 
 Foreign and 
interregional 
Saving 
ROC/ROW     (5) Imports from 
ROC/ROW 
Factor 
Income to 
ROC/ROW 
Transfer   
 
 
 
3. Data Sources and dimension of the SAM 
Several different sources of information are needed to construct the SAM 
and the level of disaggregation is directly dependent on the data 
available. The smaller the benchmark economic system, the greater the 
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difficult in finding data to fill up every single cell, resulting in an 
inevitable reduction in the disaggregation level. Indeed, the regional 
accounts released by ISTAT do not have the degree of detail needed for 
building a well disaggregated regional SAM. The SRA, as set by ESA95 
(which is the EU version of the 1993 SNA), is limited to: 
1. regional industry aggregates on production activities:  
• gross value added;  
• compensation of employees;  
• employment;  
• employees;  
• gross fixed capital formation.  
2. gross domestic product per region (GDPR);  
3. Regional Income Accounts.  
 
There have been some improvements to Regional Income accounts 
between ESA70 and ESA95. There is now a detailed compilation of 
Household Disposal Income, although the accounts are limited to:  
  i. the Allocation of Primary Income  
 ii. the Secondary Income Distribution of Income. 
 
Accordingly, the SRA does not contain detailed information about 
interregional and international trade, or income distribution to 
institutional sectors. As a result, the use of additional information is 
necessary. The other main sources can be summarized as follows: 
• Regional Input Output Table, RIO 
• Households Expenditure Survey  
• Households Income Survey 
• National or Consolidated Disposal Income account  
• Financial Budget of the Autonomous Region of Sardinia. 
  
The RIO table (shown in Table A1 in appendix) is composed of 30 
sectors, three domestic institutions (Households, Firms and Government) 
and two external institutions: Rest of Italy (ROI) and Rest of the World 
(ROW). The RIO table also includes a column vector of Financial 
Intermediary Services Indirectly Measured (FISIM) and a row vector of 
Transfers of the Secondary Production. Using the economic activities 
classification scheme presently used by ISTAT for the classification of 
the regional account, the RIO table is aggregated to 23 sectors.  
In order to obtain a more disaggregated SAM, including a classification 
of Households split into 14 income groups, we use the 2001 Italian 
Households Expenditure Survey (hereafter HES) and the 2001 Survey on 
Household Income and Wealth (hereafter SHIW). Furthermore, to 
identify receipts and payments between institutions, the Secondary 
Income Distribution Account at regional level is required. However, as 
we have seen above, this account is released by ISTAT only for 
Households, so a regionalization of some entries of the Consolidated 
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(National) Disposal Income Account is necessary in order to identify 
total receipts and payments for each institution.    
On the basis of the sources collected, the disaggregated structure of the 
final SAM (RSAM) is presented in Table 2. Economic activities are 
classified into 23 sectors, and value added at factor cost is shared 
between labour income and operating surpluses. The latter is non-labour 
value added of GDP at factor cost that includes rent, profit and other 
capital income. Households are split into 14 income groups whilst 
external relationships are divided into interregional (the Rest of Italy) and 
international (the Rest of the World).  
 
Table 2 – Structure of the final SAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Adjusting the RIO Table. 
The RIO table constitutes the basis of the RSAM. In this table we find 
the intermediate inputs, the composition of the final demand, and 
interregional and international trade. The first operations to be carried out 
involved adjustment of the RIO table so that it can be included as part of 
the RSAM: 
 1) Allocation of FISIM among user sectors 
 2) The treatment of secondary products  
 3) Consolidation of the Gross Investment (GI) and Inventory 
      change (IC). 
4.1. Allocation of FISIM. ESA95 does not require FISIM to be allocated 
between users because, in practice, there are uncertainties about how to 
do this. In fact, the RIO Table ascribes the total value of FISIM to the 
Monetary and Financial Intermediation sector. As this is inconsistent 
with the SAM approach, the FISIM is allocated along the row entries of 
Economic activities Value added Income Groups (euros)
Agricolture, hunting,  forestry and logging Wages and Salaries 1 3718.49
Fishing and aquaculture Employers’ Social Contributions 2 3718.49 - 6197.48
Mining and Quarrying Operating Surplus 3 6197.48 - 9296.22
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tabacco Subsidies on production 4 9296.22 - 12394.97
Manufacture of textiles and wearing appareal Taxes 5 1032.91 - 15493.71
Manufacture of leather and related products Value added Tax 6 15493.71 - 18592.45
Manufacture of paper and paper products ; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials Other Indirect taxes 7 18592.45 - 24789.93
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, chemicals and pharmaceutical Indirect tax on Import 8 24789.93 - 30987.41
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 9 30987.41 - 37184.90
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Domestic Institutions 10 37184.90 - 43382.38
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products , machinery and equipment , transport equipment Government 11 43382.38 - 49579.86
Manufacture of wood, rubber, plastic products and other manufacturing Household (14 income groups) 12 49579.86 - 61974.83
Electricity, Gas and water supply 13 61974.83 - 74369.79
Construction 14 - 74369.79
Wholesale and Retail trade; Repair of Motor vehicles and motorcycles Foreign Institurion
Accomodation and food sevice activities Rest of Italy Import/Export
Transportation and Storage Rest of the World Import/Export
Financial and Insurance activities
Real estate activities, Professional, Scientific and Technical activities Capital Formation Investment/saving
Public administration and defence; Compulsory social security
Education
Human Health and social work activities
Other service activities
 7 
 
the Monetary and Financial Intermediation sector according to the 
following share,  , defined as: 
 
 = 	   
 
where  stand for Value Added and the apex  f  means that we are 
dealing with the value added at factor cost. Once FISIM is spread along 
the Monetary and Financial Intermediation sector, the is reduced by 
the same amount in order to rebalance the RIO table.  
 
4.2. Secondary production. Let 
, be the vector of secondary production 
and A the technical coefficients matrix. We can find the matrix of 
secondary production flows S, as follows: 
  =  ∙ 
 
 
where the hat indicates the diagonal matrix. Now, we are able to 
determine a new matrix, G, by the difference between the inter-industry 
matrix M and S:  
  =  −  
 
and we obtain the new technical coefficient matrix ∗as: 
 ∗ =  ∙  
 
where  is the diagonal matrix of total production. Now, we can re-
define the final demand Y in order to obtain a balanced RIO table: 
 ∗ =  − ∗ 
 
where I is the identity matrix. With this approach, the vector of 
secondary production has been allocated to the economic activities while 
preserving the original total of production.  
 
4.3. Consolidation of Gross fixed capital formation and Inventory 
change. Gross capital formation, GFK, is measured by the total value of 
the gross fixed capital formation, GFKF, and changes in inventories, IC. 
In the RIO table, the capital formation account contains both GFKF and 
IC but does not provide the whole measure of GFK. So we need to 
consolidate the GFKF and IC vectors in order to have a measure of 
GKF. The new vector of consolidated investment is GKF=GFKF+IC. 
As the IC vector contains some negative values, a single element of 
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GKF could be less than zero. In this case, the single elements of GFK 
take the value zero and, to re-balance the RIO, Household consumption is 
reduced.  
 
 
5. From the RIO to the RSAM 
The aim so far has been to make the data supplied by the RIO table 
consistent with that in the RSAM. In this section we focus on the 
construction of the SAM for Sardinia, based on the adjusted RIO and 
focusing on the sub-matrices that mainly differentiate the SAM from an 
Input-Output, that is: 
• The primary income formation 
• The allocation of primary income to institutional sectors 
• The transfer among institutions  
Essentially, we are introducing the distributional process of income. IO 
focuses on production and it is therefore inadequate for capturing the 
complexity of the interrelations between production, on the one hand, 
and consumption and distribution on the other.  
 
5.1. Primary income formation: value added decomposition. Most of the 
information we need is already supplied by the RIO table which provides 
total value added at factor cost, indirect taxes on production, value added 
tax (VAT) and subsidies on product distributed amongst sectors. As 
noted above, some aggregates of the RIO table do not match the figures 
reported in the SRA. In fact, VA at factor cost (both its total amount and 
its distribution among sectors) is slightly different from that in the SRA, 
and so the total amount of indirect net taxes
4
 also differs. Therefore, the 
following operations will be based on VA supplied by the SRA and 
inconsistency with indirect net taxes is solved in section 8 by imposing a 
control aggregate variable in the CE model.    
VA at factor cost is split into its principal components: Labour Income 
(LI), or compensation of employees, and Gross Operating Surplus 
(GOS). LI is shared between Wages and Salaries (W&S) and Employers’ 
Social Contributions (ESC). W&S also includes the value of any social 
contributions and income taxes payable by the employees
5
. The SRA 
give us the W&S and ESC amongst sectors and the total amount of the 
GOS (not spread by sectors). As a result we can easily obtain the GOS 
for each sector as a residual. Unfortunately, at this stage we are not able 
to distinguish between gross and net VA, due to a lack of data on the 
consumption of fixed capital at regional level.  
 
                                                 
4
 We cannot compare the distribution of indirect taxes amongst sectors because the SRA 
only lists totals.  
5
 Unfortunately we do not have enough information to separate ESC into Employers’ 
Actual Social Contribution and Employers’ Imputed Social Contribution. 
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5.2. The allocation of Primary Income to institutional sectors. The only 
information we have from ISTAT is the Household Disposal Income 
account; from this we get the information for Households concerning 
W&S (8277.3), ESC (2826.2) and GOS (9375.7) which give a total 
primary income of 20479.2. SRA provides total GOS (13239.18) which 
must be allocated between Firms and Government (equal to 3863.48 = 
13239.18 - 9375.7). This figure is split according to the shares obtained 
by GOS in the National Primary Income Distribution Account, available 
in the National Disposal Income account. That is: 0.04% for Government 
and 0.96 for Firms.  
 
   Table 3 - Allocation of primary income 
  W&S ESC GOS 
Households 8277.30 2826.20 9375.7 
Firms - - 3708.94 
Government - - 154.53 
Total 8277.30 2826.20 13239.18 
 
5.3. Transfers among Institutions. The compilation of the sub-matrix of 
transfers (see Table 4) requires information about receipts and payments 
of current transfers between institutions. This data may be found in the 
Secondary Income Distribution (SID) account. However, it is only 
available for Households so we proceed as follows: first we obtain a 
macro regional SID account to determine total receipts and total 
payments for each institution, then, with a non linear optimization model, 
all the cells , as represented in Table 4 are estimated. 
 
Table 4 - Transfer matrix 
   
Households 
 
Firms 
 
Government 
 
ROW 
 
Total 
receipts 
 
Households 
   ,   ,   ,!"#  ,∎ 
 
Firms 
 ,  ,  ,   ,!"#  ,∎ 
 
Government 
  ,   ,   ,    ,!"#   ,∎ 
 
ROW 
 !"#,  !"#,  !"#,   !"#,!"#  !"#,∎ 
 
Total 
payments 
 ∎,  ∎,  ∎,   ∎,!"#  ∎,∎ 
 
 
The regional Households SID account, reported in Table 5, gives total 
Household receipts ,∎ and total Households payments ∎, that 
amounts to 5956.3 and 6920.5 (in millions of euros) respectively. In fact, 
total resources, less BPI (Balance of Primary Income) give total receipts, 
whilst total uses less Gross Disposal Income gives the total payments. As 
for total receipts, Households receive a total amount of 5541 given by SB 
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(5493) and OTC (48 = 381.30-330.30) from Government, and 333 for 
OCT and 82 for SC (46) and SB (36) from Firms. Total household 
payment is given by the payments for CT (2710), SC (3784), SB (36) and 
OCT (391).  
 
Table 5 - Secondary Income Distribution account for Households 
(millions of euro) 
 
  Resource Uses 
Balance of primary income 20479,20 - 
Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. (CT) 0,00 2710,00 
.Current taxes on income 0,00 0,00 
.Other current taxes  0,00 0,00 
Social contributions (SC) 46,00 3784,00 
.. Actual social contributions 34,00 3535,00 
... Actual social contribution (employer) 34,00 2537,00 
... Actual social contribution (employee) 0,00 648,00 
… Actual social contribution (self-employed and unemployed) 0,00 350,00 
.. Imputed social contribution 12,00 249,00 
Social benefit (SB) 5529,00 36,00 
Other current transfer (OCT) 381,30 390,50 
.. From Government 0,00 0,00 
.. From other institutions 333,30 344,50 
. Net non-life insurance premiums 0,00 190,00 
. Non-life insurance claims 231,00 0,00 
. Current transfer within general Government 0,00 - 
. International current aid 0,00 0,00 
.. From EU 0,00 0,00 
. Miscellaneous current transfer 150,30 200,50 
.. From Government  0,00 0,00 
.. From other institutions 0,00 0,00 
… 4° resource based on GDP 0,00 0,00 
Gross disposal income   19515,00 
Total  26435,50 26435,50 
 
 Source: ISTAT, 2005 
 
Now we need to get some regional values concerning the BPI, Gross 
Regional Disposal Income (GRDI), total resources and total uses for the 
total regional economy as well as for non-Households institutions: Firms, 
Government and Rest of the Italy/World (ROI/W). 
The values of BPI for each institution are found in section 5.3; other 
information is found by regionalizing some entries of the National SID 
account. Specifically, the total Sardinian sources is a share of the national 
one found proportionally to the ratio of regional to national gross 
domestic product. Then the result is distributed amongst non-Household 
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institutions in proportion to the distribution of shares found in the 
National SID. GRDI is determined by maintaining the ratio between 
Gross National Disposal Income (GNDI) and BPI as in the National SID, 
where the GNDI is less than the primary income (BPI), indicating an 
appropriation of the primary income operated by the secondary 
distribution process.  
 
Table 6 - Sardinian Macro SID Account and Total Receipts and 
Payments 
  
Total 
Sardinia Households Firms Government ROI/W 
Balance of Primary Income (BPI) 27187,98 20479,20 3708,94 2999,84 0,00 
Total sources (TS) 44403,55 26435,50 4373,05 13194,31 400,68 
Gross Regional Disposal Income (GRDI) 27071,32 19515,00 2263,73 5292,59 0,00 
Total Using (TU) 44286,89 26435,50 4373,05 13194,31 284,02 
       
 ∎,∎ ,∎ ,∎  ,∎ !"#,∎ 
 
Receipts (TS-BPI) 17215,57 5956,30 664,11 10194,47 400,68 
      
 ∎,∎ ∎, ∎, ∎,  ∎,!"# 
                                                                                                        
 
Payments (TU-GRDI) 17215,57 6920,50 2109,32 7901,73 284,02 
 
 
Now it would be quite easy to obtain the total uses. Since the ROI/W can 
be the only unbalanced institution, its value has been obtained as a 
residual in order to get total receipts equal to total payments. The 
resulting Macro SID accounts for Sardinia, along with the receipts and 
payments are reported in table 6.   
With total receipts and payments available for each institution, we are 
able to estimate the transfer matrix by means of a Doubly Constrained 
Minimum Information (MI) model (Schneider and Zenios, 1990). Let T 
denote total payment or receipts (which correspond to ∎,∎ in Table 4) 
and for each I = H, F, G, ROI/W, let % =[ ,∎, ,∎,  ,∎, !"#,∎] and &=[∎,, ∎,, ∎, , ∎,!"#] be respectively the receipts and payments 
for institutions I. Considering ', the model estimated probabilities that 
any institution receive from J and pay to I where I = J  and some prior 
probabilities '(,, the model can be formalized as follow: 
 min   , , ', -./ 0','(,1 − 13 
subject to , tI,J = PI
T
I
;   , tI,J = RJ
T
J
; 
 
As we do not have a previous transfer matrix for Sardinia, the prior 
probabilities '(,are derived from the Italian transfer matrix built by 
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IRPET for the year 1998. Since the vectors % and & are derived from 
the regionalization process described above, they may contain some 
measurement error. Therefore the MI model can be written in the 
following way: 
 Min , , ', -./ 0','(,1 − 13  + , , -./ 07,8
97:,89 1 − 138 +  , , -./ 07,8
!7:,8! 1 − 138  (1) 
 
where 7,89,! and 7:,89,! are respectively the model estimated weights of the 
error e and their prior distribution. 
 The constraint equations are the following:  
 , ', = & + ;9 ;   , ', = <% + ;
!= ; (2) 
 = , & + ;9 = , % + ;!  (3) 
;9 =  , 7,898  >89 ;   ;! =  , 7,8!8  >8!  (4) 
, 7,898 = 1  and , 7,8!8 = 1; (5) 
 
Introduction of the error terms in this MI model follows Robinson, 
Cattaneo and El Said (2001) which introduced error terms in a CE model 
in order to balance a macro SAM for Mozambique.  
In the formulation of the problem specified above [(1), (2), (3) ,(4), (5)] 
two noise variables are identified: ;9 and ;!. The former is related to P 
while the latter is associated to R. So, unlike the previous MI model, 
receipts and payments contain some possible measurement errors that 
matter for the estimated probabilities ', as can be seen in equation (2). 
Furthermore such errors are reproduced in the total receipts (or 
payments) T as in equation (3). The error terms are seen as a weighted 
average of a constant term v as in equation (4), where the weights w must 
respect the constraints specified in (5), as is usual in this kind of 
formulation. The set h defines the dimension of the support set for the 
error distribution and the number of weights that must be estimated for 
each error. The prior variance of the error term can be specified as AB =	 7:C,88  >(8B , whilst we define a domain for the support set of ±3 standard 
errors (see Golan, Judge, and Miller, 1996 and Robinson, Cattaneo and 
El-Said, 2001).  
 13 
 
Thus the transfer matrix is derived by minimizing equation (1) subject to 
the constraints equation (2), (3), (4) and (5). The resulting matrix is 
presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7 - Transfers among Institutions 
  
 
Households Firms Government ROW 
Total 
receipts 
Households 164,57 1577,69 4012,70 201,33 5956,29 
Firms 175,40 117,49 337,86 33,46 664,21 
Government 6463,07 356,60 3323,21 49,23 10192,11 
ROW 117,45 58,04 225,22 0,00 400,71 
Total 
payments 6920,49 2109,82 7898,99 284,02 17213,34 
 
 
6. Splitting Households in 14 income groups. 
In this section, Households are split into 14 income groups (see table 2). 
Not only are the vectors of income and consumption split, but also 
payments and receipts for every single household group. The 
disaggregation is achieved by means of information contained in HES 
and in SHIW. HES is primarily a survey of household expenditure on 
goods and services. It collects detailed information on expenditures and 
on the characteristics of a sample of households resident throughout Italy 
and classifies them into 14 income groups. SHIW mainly gathers data on 
the incomes and savings of Italian households, plus some other aspects of 
households’ economic and financial behaviour. In both surveys we can 
identify the Sardinian sample.  
 
6.1. Households income. The total income earned by households, D, 
and its components given by labour income DE, capital income DF 
and transfers DG from the other institutions (determined in the previous 
sections 5.2 and 5.3) are split in 14 income groups through a system of 
weights H8, obtained from SHIW. Also from SHIW, we find the 
average labour income, D8,EI , the average capital income, D8,FI , and the 
average transfer income, D8,GI , for each group. Given J8 the number of 
households for each group h (from HES), the total average income, D8,GKLMN  is determined as follows: 
 D8,GKLMN = D8,I ∙ J8  where I =L,K,T 
 
Now, we can find a system of weights H8, such that the income for h 
Households and for the I  category is given by: 
 D8,∗ = D ∙ H8, 
 
where 
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H8, = OP,QRSTUV	 OP,QRSTUVP 6  
 
6.3. Household consumption. In order to split Household consumption 
into 14 income groups, we first construct a share ℎ ×  matrix G, 
obtained from HES, where h is the 14 income groups, and s the 12 
categories of expenditure. Now, using the Household total consumption 
for expenditure category supplied by SRA, g, we can find a ℎ ×  
matrix Y = [[8,\] as follows:  
 Y =  ∙ ]  
 
The next step is to translate Y into a matrix with 14 household and 23 
sectors. To this end, we use the bridge coefficients ^ ×  matrix, _ =`aC,\b, that allow us to convert an expenditure category configuration s (as 
in C) to a sector configuration i. So the matrix c of Household 
consumption ^ × ℎ is obtained as follows (see Table 8): 
  c =  _ × Y′   
 
The Sardinian bridge coefficient matrix B is derived from a doubly 
constrained minimum information (MI) model as explained for 
estimating the transfer matrix. However, at this time, we are not 
considering errors terms. The prior information is given by the Italian 
bridge matrix for the year 1992
7
, whereas the vector of household 
consumption for 23 sectors is contained in the RIO table. In Table A2 in 
the Appendix we report the Sardinia Bridge flow matrix. 
 
6.4. Transfer of Households to other institutions. Previously, we have 
dealt with the transfers of income received by households as payment 
from other institutions. Now we turn to payments made by the h 
households to other institutions. The vector of Households’ payments 
reported in Table 6 (175 to Firms, 6494 to Government and 117 to ROW) 
must be spread between h groups. The main difficulty is due to the fact 
that SHIW does not specify any variables relating to the transfer of 
income from households to other institutions. Thus we have made the 
assumption that each h Household transfers part of its income 
proportionally to its total income. 
                                                 
6
 As SHIW does not contain sufficient data to split the transfer of Household from 
Government, Firms, External Institutions and the same Households, the same weight, H8,L is applied in this case. Moreover the transfers of income between h, are considered 
to be made within the same group of Households.   
7
 The Italian bridge matrix built by ISTAT for the year 1992 links 57 expenditure 
categories to 110 sector. It is aggregated in order to reduce the number of categories to 
12 and sectors to 23. 
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Table 8 – Households consumption matrix (millions of euro) 
 
 
 
 
7. Sector Financial Balance.  
The sectoral financial balance requires that: d − e +   − f  = g −h − %, where the private sector portfolio (saving, S, less investment, I) 
plus the government deficit/surplus  (total resources, T, less expenditure, 
G) equals the current account imbalance (export, E, less import, M, less 
net transfer, TR).  
Households’ and Firms’ savings are calculated as balanced items: total 
income less expenditure. The Government deficit is obtained from the 
2001 Financial Budget of the Region of Sardinia (Consiglio Regionale 
della Sardegna XIII Legislatura, 2001). The capital inflow/outflow to and 
from the ROI and the ROW is determined by imputing the trade deficit 
(M-E) as capital inflows: 1719 for ROI and 2788 for ROW.  
We know from the SRA that the total net import (both ROI and ROW) 
for the year 2001 is positive and equal to 4809.3, slightly greater than the 
one obtained as a residual, namely 4507 = 1719+2788. At this stage we 
are not able to re-determine the new level of current account balance, but 
it will be sorted out in the next section where the adjusting and balancing 
problems are treated. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total
Agricolture, hunting,  forestry and logging 3.38 16.40 36.08 66.65 61.47 29.33 62.67 25.90 7.13 3.95 5.59 0.20 0.00 1.56 320.30
Fishing and aquaculture 0.46 3.23 6.35 12.51 10.20 6.88 9.05 4.05 1.92 0.82 0.57 0.02 0.00 0.25 56.31
Mining and Quarrying 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tabacco 15.93 108.55 215.52 422.19 348.49 227.79 313.89 139.28 62.84 27.36 20.60 0.67 0.00 8.54 1911.64
Manufacture of textiles and wearing appareal 6.31 44.80 88.00 173.46 141.45 95.36 125.45 56.18 26.57 11.34 7.84 0.25 0.00 3.45 780.46
Manufacture of leather and related products 2.06 14.59 28.66 56.50 46.08 31.06 40.87 18.30 8.65 3.69 2.55 0.08 0.00 1.12 254.22
Manufacture of paper and paper products ; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 1.15 4.48 10.54 30.55 36.79 40.93 39.52 22.57 6.96 9.31 2.93 0.09 0.00 2.78 208.60
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, chemicals and pharmaceutical 3.06 27.96 50.11 122.29 128.53 98.46 142.10 84.91 31.09 20.91 8.81 0.29 0.00 6.30 724.83
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.21 2.20 4.55 15.33 13.20 8.12 11.95 10.09 3.32 1.23 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.85 72.00
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.23 1.38 2.76 6.16 6.26 5.12 7.03 3.47 1.26 1.05 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.28 35.48
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products , machinery and equipment , transport equipment 4.50 33.08 72.30 157.41 167.51 110.56 150.47 95.38 30.87 20.66 7.66 0.15 0.00 8.01 858.57
Manufacture of wood, rubber, plastic products and other manufacturing 2.15 11.20 25.29 64.24 74.89 74.89 80.88 44.99 15.59 15.50 5.31 0.14 0.00 4.22 419.29
Electricity, Gas and water supply 4.59 43.65 76.06 130.76 138.51 75.79 113.55 70.63 24.52 11.50 8.97 1.00 0.00 5.02 704.56
Construction 0.17 1.58 2.76 4.73 5.02 2.73 4.11 2.57 0.89 0.42 0.33 0.04 0.00 0.18 25.52
Wholesale and Retail trade; Repair of Motor vehicles and motorcycles 14.79 113.47 288.71 767.96 775.65 649.73 744.14 450.99 193.19 75.45 57.55 0.02 0.00 17.86 4149.50
Accomodation and food sevice activities 2.54 44.88 87.28 366.57 292.70 219.51 374.51 196.03 104.67 46.06 28.52 1.28 0.00 7.94 1772.49
Transportation and Storage 6.48 42.46 106.53 237.26 264.14 217.22 238.76 131.52 54.74 29.71 13.35 0.63 0.00 5.23 1348.03
Financial and Insurance activities 1.39 11.75 19.90 52.11 59.25 55.96 79.86 40.92 16.15 13.73 4.36 0.06 0.00 2.85 358.30
Real estate activities, Professional, Scientific and Technical activities 17.42 165.23 287.93 501.15 534.34 301.67 448.51 276.87 96.54 47.67 34.83 3.75 0.00 19.69 2735.58
Public administration and defence; Compulsory social security 0.21 1.43 2.72 6.01 6.05 4.73 7.16 3.46 1.33 0.99 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.23 34.78
Education 0.49 6.16 12.69 33.74 62.57 34.48 49.38 29.84 7.14 2.65 3.60 0.02 0.00 0.90 243.66
Human Health and social work activities 1.62 13.92 26.85 56.21 62.33 44.46 69.00 36.95 13.79 9.72 3.09 0.05 0.00 2.37 340.37
Other service activities 3.21 30.00 56.36 155.26 151.50 109.45 156.88 104.93 37.19 21.09 10.78 0.23 0.00 8.16 845.03
Total 92.36 742.46 1508.00 3439.22 3387.06 2444.32 3269.83 1849.87 746.36 374.82 229.09 8.99 0.00 107.82 18200.20
Income groups
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8. ew information and balancing 
Operations carried out thus far use a mixture of different sources which, 
in some cases, are not linked to each other. For instance, HES has been 
carried out independently of SHIW, furthermore, in the RIO table some 
macro-variables, such as GDP and total households consumptions, are 
not consistent with the data reported in SRA. Therefore, the unbalanced 
SAM reported in the appendix is adjusted using the Cross-Entropy model 
(Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said, 2001
8
). Looking at the unbalanced 
SAM, we can see that the main discrepancies occur in sectoral 
production and in the sector financial balance.  
 
8.1. The CE model. The unbalanced SAM 'C,,  provides the prior 
distribution j,ia  and data on column sum jx  that we hypothesis to be 
measured with error. Then, according to Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said 
(2001) the CE problem can be formalized as an equations system with 
variables measured with noises: 
 iC = j + ; (6)                                  
where iC is the sum in row and ; is the errors terms. We know also 
that: , kC,C  j = i     (7) 
and , kC, = 1 with  0 < kC, ≤ 1C  (8) 
           
The error term ; can be also seen as a weighted average of known 
constants ν : 
 , 7C,88  >8 = ;C  (9) 
                 
where 7C,8 is an h-dimensional vector of weights treated as probability to 
be estimated. It means that  7C,8 has to satisfy the following constraints: 
 , 7C,8 = 18 and 0 < 7C,8 ≤ 1; (10) 
the constant >8 is the support set for the error and is always selected to 
produce a symmetrical distribution around zero. 
                                                 
8
 The CE model derives from the information theory developed by Shannon (1948) and 
from Theil’s work (1967) which transposed Shannon’s approach into economic 
problems. For more detail about the CE approach see Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said 
(2000). They used a CE approach to estimate a consistent  Macro-SAM for 
Mozambique, starting from inconsistent data estimated with error. 
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Now we can define a model in which the optimization problem is to 
find a set of A’s and W’s that minimize the following cross entropy 
equation: 
 
r, H; (, H:  = s, , kC, ./ 0kC,ktC,1C u + v, , 7C,8 ./ 07C,87:C,818C w (11) 
 
subject to equations (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10).  
In equation (11), ktC, and 7:C,8 are the prior probabilities, whereas kC, 
and 7C,8 are treated as probabilities to be estimated (posterior 
distribution). The object is to minimize the joint entropy distance H in 
order to get the matrix A and W close to their priors A  and W .  It is 
worth remembering that in this CE model specification, we are assuming 
an error term in a variable (the error term is attached to the variable j) 
and not in an equation. In other words, the error in this model is due to 
the hypothesis that the sum in column j has been measured with noise 
rather than assuming a model that includes random noise through an error 
term in its equations (for an application see Golan and Vogel, 2000).   
Considering k aggregate constraints and an n-by-n aggregator matrix G, 
we can include in the constraints set some information about the new 
SAM. We can write: 
 , , xC,yC  'C, =  γz (12) 
 
where 'C, is the SAM transaction matrix and γz is the value of the 
aggregate constraints, that is, the new information we are adding to the 
CE. The aggregate macro data introduced in the model via equation (7) 
does not preserve the same values as those of the initial SAM 
(unbalanced). Basically we introduce new constraints into the model in 
order to adjust the figures to be consistent with the regional account data. 
This means that the explicit application of the CE approach on the 
Sardinia SAM is not only used as a simple balancing method, but is also 
an adjustment procedure to incorporate new information in order to 
produce a well defined scheme of data as close as possible to the official 
data. 
The set of additional restrictions that constrain some sub-matrices of the 
SAM are reported in the table below. On the production side, the total 
GDP at factor cost and valued at market price, is constrained to the 
figures reported in SRA.  On the demand side the total Household 
consumption, government consumption and investment demand are also 
restricted. The overall trade deficit (interregional and international) is 
constraint to the net import entry reported in SRA.   
In developing the CE model specified above, it is assumed that totals in 
the rows and columns, and the macro aggregates are inexact due to 
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measurement errors. The error term in equation (4) is a weighted sum of 
a constant ν where the set h defines the dimension of the support set for 
the error distribution and the number of weights that must be estimated 
for each error. As in Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996) and Robinson, 
Cattaneo and El-Said (2001), given the prior variance on the error term AB = 	 7:C,88  >(8B  we define a domain for the support set of ±3 standard 
errors. By considering variance, skewness, and kurtosis the moments of 
the error distribution, in order to get a symmetric distribution around 
zero, both the vector of the prior weight and the vector of the support set 
should contains 5 elements (see, Golan, Judge, and Miller, 1996 and 
Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said, 2001). 
 
       Table 9 - Macro Variable constraints (millions of euros) 
Value added at factor cost 24342.68 
Net Indirect Taxes 3204.91 
Gross regional product (market price) 27547.59 
Household Consumption 18200.2 
Government consumption 7662.10 
Investment Demand 6403.50 
Overall trade deficit 4809.28 
 
Once the prior distribution is determined, the CE is solved by minimizing 
equation (11) subject to equations (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10). The 
optimization problem yields the following posterior distributions: 
 kC, = ktC, exp<~Ci=	 kC, exp<~Ci=C       
 
 
and 7C,8 = 7:C,8 exp ~C>8	 7C,8 exp ~C>8C,8  
 
 
where ~C is the Lagrange multiplier and the denominator in both 
equations is a normalization factor (see Golan, Judge, and Miller, 1996 
and Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said, 2001).  
 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
An increasing number of countries have found the SAM framework 
useful for designing socio-economic policy. However there is still some 
resistance to the use of this useful integrated data framework at regional 
level. 
This paper has detailed a process for constructing the SAM for Sardinia. 
We have combined different sources, including country specific features, 
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describing how the different data might be integrated and adjusted. We 
faced a number of snags in the compilation of some specific sub-matrices 
since the actual system of regional accounts is still inadequate, especially 
the regional income accounts. We have endeavoured to produce a 
satisfactory solution for this which, however, is still not enough. 
Obviously, there is opportunity for improvement and further 
developments are needed. 
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R&D Investment and External Knowledge 
Spillovers: the impact of regional R&D subsidy in a 
computable general equilibrium model 
 
 
 
Abstract. In this paper we present a computable general equilibrium model for the 
region of Sardinia (Italy) with the purpose of evaluating the capacity of R&D policies to 
affect the long run rate of growth. The model incorporates induced technical change 
(ITC) obtained through knowledge accumulation, and external knowledge spillovers. It 
turns out that the cost of R&D policies may change according to the wage setting 
prevailing in the region. Furthermore, the capacity of such a policy to generate 
knowledge spillovers from the international and interregional trade is quite modest. 
Indeed, the capacity of the regional system to internalize the innovations embedded in 
the imported goods is partially offset by an increase in internal efficiency that lowers the 
spillover intensity through a reduction in the share of imports.  
 
 
 
JEL: R13; R58. 
 
Keywords: Regional CGE models, Induced Technical Change and R&D policies 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of regional R&D subsidy 
using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The need for this 
analysis stems from the strategic policy recently implemented by the 
Sardinia Executive. Most of the European Structural and Social Funds 
are used by the Regional Government to increase the domestic stock of 
R&D. 
The model, that we call SGEM (Sardinia General Equilibrium Model) 
incorporates an intangible factor in the production function representing 
the regional level of knowledge endowment, divided into excludable and 
non-excludable knowledge. The former is treated as a primary factor of 
production that accumulates according to traditional perpetual inventory 
change; the latter derives from potential knowledge spillover effects that 
arise from interregional and international trade. External spillover is 
incorporated into the model following some econometric findings (i.e. 
Coe and Helpman, 1995) and recent applied economic models (i.e. Diao 
et al., 1999 and Ghosh, 2007). This enables us to capture the 
complementarities between foreign trade, and local and global stocks of 
knowledge.  
As regions are more open than nations, we would expect a stronger 
effect of foreign R&D capital stock on domestic productivity since, as 
suggested by the estimates of Coe and Helpman (1995), larger 
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productivity benefit accrues to more open economies. Indeed, by 
importing more high quality and sophisticated inputs (either intermediate 
or capital goods), local production may improve its efficiency and, in 
turn, the competitiveness of the local system with respect to other 
regions. A capacity to exploit the stock of global knowledge depends on 
the expansion of international trade which is, however, an exogenous 
variable, as regions have no control over trade policy. 
As most of the Structural and Social Funds that Sardinia received from 
the EU are targeted at growth and competitiveness through increased 
domestic stock of R&D, the model sets the level of financial aid that will 
reach the long-run growth rate obtained by simulating an exogenous 
increase in competitiveness. Proceeding in this way allows us to study 
the capacity of R&D policy to achieve a sustainable target growth, 
identifying the likely cost of such a policy instrument, when knowledge 
(intangible capital) is seen as a component of the value added, and thus, 
is subject to substitution with physical capital and labour.  
In our experiment, we demonstrate the important role played by 
regional wage setting in determining the cost of R&D policies and, 
specifically, we confirm that Government policies can affect economic 
growth positively by encouraging firms to devote more resources to 
R&D activities. We find that the cost of the R&D policy, defined as a 
percentage increment of the base year R&D investment, may vary 
according to regional labour market conditions. Its cost is quite high in 
Keynesian labour market and very small for flexible wages that respond 
to a regional excess demand for labour. This is quite an interesting result, 
since one of the region’s aims is to use the financial aid provided by the 
EU more efficiently. We also find that the interregional and international 
knowledge spillovers improve growth even though their effects are rather 
modest.  
The paper proceeds with an outline of the model in section 2. In section 
3, we explain how knowledge is incorporated into the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) of Sardinia. Simulation results are described in section 4 
while section 5 is devoted to sensitivity analysis. Finally, in section 6, 
remarks and conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
2. The model of Sardinia 
Specification of production and demand parameters are obtained through 
the well known calibration method using the Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) of Sardinia for the year 2001 (Ferrari et al., 2009). The set of 
prices at which the excess demand is zero is the result of an optimization 
process, where market clearing prices equal marginal costs in each 
sector. Five economic activities or sectors are considered: Primary sector, 
Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Energy and Services. No distinction 
between traded and non-traded sectors is considered. Intermediate (VV) 
and primary inputs (capital, K, knowledge, H and labour L) constitute the 
 production inputs of the model. Firms, Households and Government are 
the three domestic institutional sector
into the Rest of the Italy (ROI) and Rest of the World (ROW). We adopt 
assumptions typically used for a small
too small to affect prices in international and interregional markets. As 
consequence, the ROI and ROW prices are taken to be exogenous. In 
addition, since Sardinia belongs to a common currency area
takes the nominal exchange rate to be fixed. Households’ and firms’ 
behaviour are the result of an optimization proces
expectations; Government is a consolidated sector merging central and 
local government levels. Its expenditure can be either the result of an 
optimization process where Government is simply treated as a new 
consumer, maximizing utility subjec
constant throughout.        
  
 
The model’s production structure is illustrated in figure 1. 
combined in a CES production function in order to produce the value 
added, Y, allowing for substitution among
production. The demand for 
condition of profit maximization
is imposed. The intermediate goods produced locally and imported are 
considered as imperfect substitutes. Basically, we mix regional and 
imported goods under the so called Armington assumption through
CES function. Furthermore
Europe (EU), North America (NA), Middle and South America (SA), 
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Africa (AFC), Oceania (OCE) and Asia (ASA), through a Leontief 
function.  
The regional commodities supply is bought by industries and by 
domestic and external institutions. That is to say, each industry in the 
region produces a composite commodity that can be exported or sold in 
the regional market. An export demand function closes the model where 
the foreign demand for Sardinian goods depends on the terms of trade 
effect and on export price elasticity.  
 
Incorporating Knowledge in SGEM 
 
Knowledge creation is the source of ITC in the model. The approach we 
take is to enlarge the set of substitution possibilities into the value added 
production function by allowing substitution between tangible (K and L) 
and intangible (H, knowledge) inputs. The magnitude of shifting between 
these alternative technologies is related to their relative price changes and 
the degree of substitutability of the inputs, C , that define the shape of Y: 
 DC,L = <C,L=`CyC,L + C8rC,L +  CNC,L b        0 < Cy,8,N < 1 
 
In other words, we are considering knowledge as a primary factor of 
production. This is also in line with one of the main changes of the new 
System of National Account 2008 (SNA 2008 Rev 1) that considers 
assets created by R&D as part of the value added.  
Price changes encourage substitution between knowledge and tangible 
inputs. Technical change arises as a consequence of an increase in the 
quantity of knowledge which, through the accumulation process, creates 
the condition for an output effect by increasing the quantity of tangible 
inputs. This contrasts with the traditional approach where induced 
technical change is determined exogenously by augmenting input 
technological coefficients. Our approach is quite similar to the one used 
by Bovenberger and Smulders (1995), Goulder and Shneider (1999) and 
Sue Wing (2003) for ITC in climate policy analysis. However, in our 
case we consider knowledge as part of the value added allowing 
substitution between primary factors of production.  
The scale factor  in the production function is related to non-
excludable knowledge which is the result of external spillover, C,L, enjoyed by all firms in sector i. Following Coe and Helpman (1995), 
Diao et al., (1999) and Ghosh (2007), we have that: 
 C,L = <1 + C,L=( 
 
where ( is the initial level of the scale factor in the production function; 
external spillover is related to import-weighted foreign R&D stock: 
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C,L =  ,   ./ d,L 
FSKr.t is the stock of domestic knowledge/stock of R&D in the rest of the 
world, and , is the fraction of import from r regions to total import 
(where r = EU, BA, SA, ASA, AFC, OCE, ROI).  is the spillover 
elasticity of regional productivity with respect to foreign R&D stock. 
Whilst  is a proxy for capacity to exploit the level of technology 
existing in foreign country,   is a measure of the intensity of spillover 
or a metric to appraise the technological closeness of the region (Coe and 
Helpman, 1995). 
 
Investment in physical capital 
 
The model incorporates a capital adjustment rule initially proposed by 
Bourguignon et al. (1989) and Jung and Thorbecke (2003) and 
compatible with Uzawa’s (1969) formulation. According to this, the 
investment capital ratio  is determined by the rate of return to capital 
(rk) and the user cost of capital (uck), allowing the capital stock to reach 
its desire level in a smooth fashion over time. This formulation is also 
compatible with those used in other regional CGE models, such as 
AMOS McGregor et al. (1996), where the optimal path of investment, I, 
is derived trough the flexible accelerator mechanism. 
 Sectoral investment with the quadratic and homogeneous adjustment 
costs (see Hayashi, 1982 and Devarajan and Go, 1999) is: 
 C,L = eC,L -1 + aC2 ∙ eC,LBC,L3 
 
So, total investment by destination  C,L, is given by net investment 
demand by destination eC,L and adjustment cost  1 + B ∙ ,TF,T where b is 
an adjustment parameter. 
 
R&D investment 
 
Technical change occurs through time in response to accumulated 
knowledge obtained from investment in R&D. Given R, the investment 
in R&D, H accumulates as follows: 
 r C,L = %C,L, rC,L 
where,   
 % > 0; r < 0 
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Unless specified differently, the knowledge adjustment mechanism 
follows the flexible accelerator mechanism: 
 %^,' = ~ ∙ `r^,'∗ − r^,'b + r ∙ r^,' 
 
where r^,'∗  is the desired level of knowledge capital stock and ~ is the 
speed of adjustment; r^,'∗   is obtained by solving a cost minimization 
problem. 
  
Migration 
 
We assume that there is no natural population change but that labour 
forces adjust through a migration model commonly employed in AMOS 
(Harrigan et al.1991, McGregor at al. 1996). The model starts with zero 
net migration flow, and in any period migration is taken to be positively 
related to the gap between regional (w/cpi) and national (w
B
/cpi
B
) real 
wage, and negatively related to the gap between national (u
B
) and 
regional unemployment rates (u): 
 /^L =  − [./L − ./ t +   -./   7L[¡^L¢ − ./ 0 7[¡^13 
 
where nim is the rate of net migration and  is a parameter calibrated in 
order to get zero net migration.  and  are elasticities that measure 
the impact of the gap between regional and national unemployment rate 
and real wage rate. 
The model also incorporates two labour market closures defining the 
form of wage setting according to the following labour market regimes: 
regional wage bargaining (RB) and national bargaining (NB). In the 
regional wage bargaining regime the labour market is defined by the 
wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) according to which, wage 
and unemployment are negatively related. The wage-setting function is 
defined as follow: 
 ./  7L[¡^L = £ − ¤ ./ L 
 
where cpi is the consumer price index, £ is a parameter calibrated to the 
steady state and u is the regional unemployment rate. ¤ is the elasticity of 
wages related to the level of unemployment rate and it can also be 
interpreted as an index of wage flexibility. Thus the regional wage is 
directly related to the worker’s bargaining power and it responds to the 
excess demand for labour.  
NB is a typical Keynesian closure rule. It assumes that the nominal 
wage is fixed at the base year level. We can imagine that the regional 
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nominal wage is fixed at the value of the national wage due to a national 
bargaining regime. For that reason this rule could be called National 
Bargaining (Harrigan and al. 1991 and McGregor et al. 1996).  
Receipts and payment transfers between institutions are an increasing 
function of the consumer price index.  
 
 
3. Data and Calibration 
Lack of regional information on intangible components prevents a 
straightforward inclusion of R&D services into a SAM framework so  a 
vector of Sardinia R&D investment expenditure by sectors j, %¥ was 
found from the National Account System (ISTAT, 2005). In order to 
determine a vector of investment by sector of origin, %CK, an aggregated 
version of the Yale Technology Matrix (YTM) built by Evenson et. al. 
(1989) is used. The YTM is based on patents granted in Canada, where 
the row represents the industries that are producing knowledge and the 
columns the industries that are receiving technology. The YTM has been 
widely used in order to account for knowledge linkage in different 
countries. For instance, Evenson and Putman (1993) have used the YTM 
for Italy, Basant (1993) for India and H. van Meijl (1997) has used it for 
France. By multiplying the YTM, C, for the diagonal vector of 
investment in R&D by sector of destination,  %¦¥, we obtain the 
investment by sector of origin, %CK. 
 %CK = , C,%¦¥  
 
Intangible capital r is determined by using the perpetual inventory 
change equation that, in a steady state condition with zero growth, leads 
to the following formulation: r = %¥ 
 
where  is the depreciation rate of knowledge capital. A corresponding 
amount of saving S¨, generated from knowledge income must be 
determined. Since in equilibrium savings equal investment we have: 
 d = , %C©C = , %¥  
 
In table 1, a SAM framework is reported, highlighting the allocation of 
the new knowledge components. Both rand %C© are allocated in the 
shaded parts of the sub matrix F and in the knowledge capital formation 
 vector HF. The resulting knowledge income and saving
exclusively to household
We make the assumption that the intangible components are already 
embodied in the SAM. In particular 
value added vector 
Furthermore household income and saving derived from the intangible 
component are already incorporated in
components that were 
corresponding values of the SAM
leads to some negative figures
imposing some macro variable control
constraints, to allocate the new components
matrices. Essentially, we base our estimations on the well known works 
of Golan, Judge and Robinson (1994) and Robinson, Cattaneo and El
Said (2001). The CE model and the set of additional restrictions that 
constrain some sub
 
Table 1 
Import data for EU, BA, SA, AFC, OCE
(2005) whilst the level of R&
the data provided by OECD (2004). In table 2, some selected benchmark 
values are reported.
related to Italy and  found in Coe and Helpman
have any values for SA, OCE and AFC we have arbitrarily ascribe to 
them the value 0.001.
The model calibration process 
long-run equilibrium. The parameters are generally obtained by the SAM 
using the well known cal
cost parameter £ in the investment equation is 1.5. The SAM does not 
supply information concerning the physical investment by destination 
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s, the shaded parts of the sub-matrices 
r is conceptually embodied in the 
and %C©  is already included in the investment vector. 
to household wealth. So the new 
previously determined must be subtracted 
. Unfortunately this simple operation 
 so we use a Cross Entropy (CE) model
s as constraints plus some single 
 to the corresponding sub
-matrices of the SAM can be seen in Appendix B
 
- SAM structure -Knowledge within the SAM
 
 and ASA are supplied by ISTAT 
D capital stock by regions is derived from 
 The values of external spillover elasticities are those 
 (1995). As we did n
 
assumes the economy to be initially in 
ibration method. The value of the adjustment 
YF and S.  
from the 
, 
-
-
.  
- 
 
ot 
J, 
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so from the System of Regional Account (ISTAY, 2005), through the 
capital matrix hC, the equality condition with total investment by 
origin in the SAM hold (see Appendix C, for the construction of hC,).  
As in a deterministic approach some parameters remains unspecified, 
they need to be found from outside the model. For this reason the 
elasticity of substitutions A (in trade and production), as well as other 
behavioural parameters, are based on econometric estimation or best 
guess. The unemployment elasticity ¤ is equal to 0.03. This is the value 
econometrically estimated for the South of Italy in Devicenti et al. 
(2007).  and  are the coefficients in the migration function 
estimated by Layard et al. (1991) for the UK economy. Objections can be 
raised concerning these parameters estimated using UK data but, 
unfortunately, the lack of data at regional level (especially in Sardinia) 
precludes a more suitable approach. The elasticity of substitution is set at 
0.3 in production and equal to 2 for trade. 
 
 
Table 2 - Selected benchmark values 
    Share of 
R&D stock 
   Import 
share 
Spillover 
elasticity 
Countries % %  
North America 0.39 0.03 0.0254 
Asia 0.29 0.04 0.0027 
Europe 0.27 0.25 0.0166 
South America 0.03 0.01 0.0010 
Oceania 0.01 0.00 0.0010 
Africa 0.01 0.08 0.0010 
Italy 0.01 0.58 0.0018 
 
 
4. Model solution, simulation strategy and policy analysis 
The model’s equations are solved simultaneously for a given finite time 
horizon. The model can also be run for two static time periods: short run 
and long run. For the short run the supply side is fixed, so capital and 
labour supplies are kept at their base year value. For the long run we 
relax all supply side constraints, allowing for capital and labour 
adjustment. In this time frame, capital stock is at its optimum level, so 
rental rates and user cost of capital are equal. The labour supply is fully 
adjusted so that the system exhibits zero net migration. For each time 
period, SGEM is run to find a set of prices that clears all markets: the 
supply of each produced good equals its demand and the vector of the 
equilibrium prices is the result of myopic expectations since agents are 
not forward-looking. (See the Appendix for a full list of the model’s 
equations.) 
Firstly, we simulate a permanent 5% increase in exports. The long run 
level of growth in gross regional product (GRP) that results will 
constitute our target growth. Secondly, we determine the growth rate of 
R&D investment associated with that level of growth. Thirdly, the 
percentage variation of R&D investment obtained is used to analyse in 
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detail the impact of the financial aid. Finally, cross-border spillovers are 
integrated in the model.   
All simulations are performed for both labour market regimes: national 
bargaining (NB) and regional bargaining (RB). It should be stressed from 
the outset that the figures we obtain are not forecasts for the Sardinia 
economy. The exercise should help us to track the effects of an 
exogenous stimulus using impact analysis within a general equilibrium 
framework, and a numerical support represented by the SAM. This lets 
us deal with a specific regional production structure.   
 
5% increase in export: setting the target growth 
 
Our model is quite similar to the behavioural adjustment presented in 
AMOS (McGregor et al., 1996). The increase in competitiveness would 
lead to Leontief results in the long run, where the new steady state 
equilibrium is equal for all labour market regimes: RB and NB.  
In table 3, the percentage changes from base year values are shown for 
a set of key economic variables for the national and regional bargaining 
closures. In the short run (period 1 in the table) the main differences can 
be seen in the behavior of the real wage. For the NB case, the real wage 
is below its initial equilibrium (-1.04%); indeed, as workers cannot enter 
into wage bargaining within the region, increase in aggregate demand 
raises prices thus lowering the purchasing power of workers. In RB the 
demand stimulus increases labour demand which, in turn, reduces the 
unemployment rate by -0.85% so increasing the bargaining power of 
workers and so the real wage (0.03%).  
In the long run (LR) prices of goods and wages return to their base year 
value, however, quantities are above the benchmark equilibrium. 
Regional output, employment and consumption increase by 1.441%, 
1.439% and 1.167% respectively. The new steady state equilibrium is 
obtained through adjustment in the factors of production. Capital stock 
(tangible and intangible) increases with investment, which in turn is 
affected by the real return to capital (tangible and intangible). As 
aggregate demand rises, commodity prices increase and so do firms’ 
profit expectations, therefore capital rental rate increases more than user 
cost of capital. This generates an increase in investment that will be 
moderated by the replacement cost of capital incorporated into the model. 
As for the labour supply, it increases over time in response to a rise in 
real wages and a drop in the unemployment rate until the labour market, 
in the long run, clears, and where all the increase in employment is 
covered by the increase in working population. The growth in labour 
supply should put downward pressure on wages until the labour market 
achieves its long run equilibrium and the real wage is restored to its 
original level and the price of goods adjusted totally.  
Turning to the capacity of such a demand shock to reduce the trade 
deficit, we see that, in both labour market closures, in the short run the 
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trade deficit gets worse (1.16% for RB and 3.17% for NB). However, 
year by year there are some improvements of the current account 
reducing the trade deficit in the long run by 2.18%. Indeed, the 
exogenous increase in exports raises competitiveness but the augmented 
aggregate demand generates an increase in production that needs to be 
met by increasing the demand for imported goods. Essentially, the 
negative terms of trade produce a substitution effect, lowering exports 
and raising imports in the initial periods, whilst in the medium and long 
run, exports begin to increase more than imports because of price 
adjustments. Prices approach a new steady state in which they return to 
their initial position, neutralizing, as result, the terms of trade impact.  
 
 
Table 3 - The impact of 5% increase in export for a set of key variables. 
(Percentage changes from base year values). 
Regional Bargaining        
 1 10 20 30 40 50 LR 
GRP at factor cost 0.06 0.45 0.75 0.95 1.10 1.20 1.44 
Consumer price index (CPI) 1.07 0.75 0.52 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.00 
Unemployment rate -0.85 -0.44 -0.30 -0.20 -0.14 -0.10 0.00 
Total employment 0.09 0.48 0.77 0.97 1.10 1.20 1.44 
Nominal wage 1.10 0.76 0.52 0.37 0.26 0.18 0.00 
Real wage 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital good price (tangible) 1.04 0.72 0.50 0.35 0.25 0.17 0.00 
Capital good price 
(intangible) 
1.09 0.77 0.54 0.38 0.27 0.19 0.00 
Current account 1.16 0.15 -0.57 -1.05 -1.38 -1.61 -2.18 
Labour supply 0.00 0.43 0.74 0.94 1.09 1.19 1.44 
Households Cons 0.16 0.45 0.66 0.81 0.91 0.99 1.17 
Tangible investment 0.60 0.83 1.02 1.16 1.26 1.33 1.50 
Intangible investment 0.59 1.05 1.38 1.62 1.78 1.90 2.19 
        
ational Bargaining        
GRP at factor cost 0.51 1.23 1.39 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Consumer price index (CPI) 1.06 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unemployment rate -7.78 -0.45 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Total employment 0.86 1.28 1.40 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Nominal wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Real wage -1.04 -0.16 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital good price (tangible) 0.97 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital good price 
(intangible) 
1.17 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Current account 3.17 -1.25 -1.95 -2.12 -2.16 -2.17 -2.18 
Labour supply 0.00 1.23 1.38 1.42 1.43 1.44 1.44 
Households Cons 0.51 1.01 1.12 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.17 
Tangible investment 2.96 1.63 1.52 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Intangible investment 2.84 2.16 2.17 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 
 
 
Knowledge subsidy 
 
The first object of this section is to identify the rate of growth in R&D 
investment required to achieve a pre-determined long term target growth 
in GRP of 1.44%. To this end, we run a single period model, for both 
labour markets specifications using long term closures and fixing the 
level of GRP growth at 1.44%.This growth rate was previously obtained 
by simulating a 5% increase in export.  
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The level of R&D investment will change according to the level of 
knowledge stock required to achieve the required level of GRP. The 
results are: 2.22% for RB and 4.49% for NB. Therefore, when knowledge 
is treated as a component of value added, we should pay attention to 
substitution between production factors and, especially, to wage setting 
in the region. When wages are fixed, R&D investment needs to increase 
to about 4.49%, but the same level of growth can be achieved with a 
lower increase in R&D investment when wages are bargained locally.  
The change in R&D investment can now be treated as a  subsidy to 
firms that is clearly financed from outside the region, namely we 
consider Sardinia as the recipient region of financial aid. These 
simulations are performed by permanently increasing R&D investment 
by destination by 2.22% in the regional bargaining case and 4.49% in the 
national bargaining. As in the short run we impose capacity constraints, 
the effect is a clear demand side shock. Indeed, the exogenous increase in 
R&D investment by destination (when knowledge stock is fixed), leads 
only to a rise in investment by origin which is a component of the 
aggregate demand. So supply side effect begins in the second period 
where capacity constraints are relaxed. 
Even though the transitional pathway towards the new steady state is 
different, (see Figure 2, below) for each labour market we achieve the 
same level of growth in GRP. The short and long run results of these 
simulations are illustrated in table 4: column one and two for NB and 
column three and four for RB.  
We start by considering the national bargaining case. As already noted, 
the short run equilibrium reflects a demand side impact because of 
capacity constraints imposed in the first period.  In this period, output 
and employment rise in all sectors and, due to capacity constraints, the 
percentage increase in employment is greater than the increase in value 
added. The increase in commodity prices crowd out exports leading to a 
fall in regional competitiveness, thus current account deficit increases by 
0.2481%. As nominal wages are invariant, the increase in prices reduces 
the purchasing power of workers, then the CPI rises and real wages fall (-
0.0205%).  
The capital goods price for tangible and intangible inputs are above 
their benchmark equilibrium again because of capacity constraints. 
Labour supply is fixed, though labour demand rises because aggregated 
demand expands, reducing the unemployment rate (-0.1399%).  
In the long run, there are evidence of supply side effects. With respect 
to a demand side shock, we do not get Leontief results. In fact, these are 
no longer consistent with supply side shock. Now, price adjustment 
results from an increase in investment which in turn generates direct 
change, not only in aggregate demand, but also in production. R&D 
investment increases exogenously by 4.48%, so increases in knowledge 
stock drive the long run knowledge rental rate below its benchmark 
equilibrium value. Essentially, the slope of the isocost line has changed, 
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making it efficient to substitute the now relatively cheaper knowledge 
capital for the relatively more expensive tangible inputs. Labour and 
physical capital rises proportionately less than knowledge stock.  
The relative price change has increased system-wide efficiency, so 
encouraging exports. Foreign demand for regional goods rises as regional 
prices decrease, resulting in an improvement in the current account which 
is below the base year value (-2.5321%). 
As for the labour market, contrary to the previous simulation, the 
increase in labour demand is not able to cover the whole of the increase 
in working population, yielding an increase in unemployment rate of 
0.7643%.  
The third and the fourth columns report results from the same 
simulation with regional bargaining. Again, the short run supply side 
effect is neglected. The major differences with respect to the national 
bargaining case are related to the behaviour of wages and the associated 
substitution effects in the production function. In the short run the 
nominal wage increases by 0.0101%. Such a result leads to an increase in 
employment of just 0.0004% which is substantially less than the 
corresponding figure obtained in NB. Furthermore, output and 
employment rise in all sectors other than Services.   
Induced technical change begins from the second period where the 
increase in R&D investment causes an expansion of knowledge stock 
which, in turn, leads to an increase in other production factors. This 
output effect results in a rise in employment of 1.3897% in the long run, 
which is substantially greater than that obtained with national bargaining 
(1.1027%). As the level of GRP growth is the same, this means that in a 
Keynesian framework, tangible capital stock has increased more than the 
corresponding figures for the regional bargaining case. The output effects 
that arise from R&D capital accumulation encourage more employment 
when wages are flexible, and respond to the regional bargaining power of 
workers.  
 
Figure 2 
Gross Regional Product (Percentage change from base year value) 
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Table 4 - The impact of R&D subsidy on key variables -percentage 
change with respect to the initial steady state 
                      No Spillovers Spillovers 
  [ 1 ] [ 2 ]  [ 3 ]  [ 4 ] [ 5 ] [ 6 ]  [ 7 ]  [ 8 ] 
  
Bational 
Bargaining 
Regional 
Bargaining 
Bational 
Bargaining 
Regional 
Bargaining 
  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Grp Factor Cost 0.009 1.441 0.000 1.441 0.012 1.546 0.002 1.456 
Consumer price index 0.020 -1.010 0.010 -1.094 0.018 -1.102 0.009 -1.107 
Unemployment rate -0.140 0.764 -0.003 0.000 -0.142 0.834 -0.010 0.000 
Total employment 0.016 1.103 0.000 1.390 0.016 1.116 0.001 1.400 
Nominal gross wage 0.000 0.000 0.010 -1.094 0.000 0.000 0.009 -1.107 
Real gross wage -0.020 1.020 0.000 0.000 -0.018 1.114 0.000 0.000 
Current account 0.248 -2.532 0.102 -2.624 0.246 -2.813 0.102 -2.658 
Labour supply 0.000 1.189 0.000 1.390 0.000 1.210 0.000 1.400 
Households Cons 0.008 1.102 0.001 1.036 0.011 1.175 0.002 1.047 
Spillover - - - - 0.003 0.084 0.001 0.005 
Knowledge stock             
Primary 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 
Heavy Industry 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 
Light Industry 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 
Energy 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 
Services 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 0.000 4.487 0.000 2.224 
Capital stock             
Primary 0.000 2.645 0.000 2.328 0.000 2.742 0.000 2.346 
Heavy Industry 0.000 3.225 0.000 2.381 0.000 3.316 0.000 2.396 
Light Industry 0.000 2.182 0.000 1.922 0.000 2.244 0.000 1.936 
Energy 0.000 1.783 0.000 1.473 0.000 1.827 0.000 1.482 
Services 0.000 1.038 0.000 1.177 0.000 1.070 0.000 1.187 
Value added             
Primary 0.015 2.654 0.002 2.316 0.019 2.807 0.004 2.338 
Heavy Industry 0.011 3.386 0.002 2.342 0.015 3.526 0.004 2.359 
Light Industry 0.016 2.346 0.002 1.969 0.019 2.466 0.004 1.986 
Energy 0.019 1.977 0.007 1.563 0.022 2.089 0.008 1.577 
Services 0.008 1.061 0.000 1.238 0.011 1.159 0.001 1.252 
Employment             
Primary 0.022 2.362 0.003 2.329 0.023 2.430 0.004 2.347 
Heavy Industry 0.021 2.941 0.003 2.382 0.022 3.003 0.004 2.397 
Light Industry 0.025 1.901 0.003 1.923 0.026 1.933 0.004 1.937 
Energy 0.044 1.503 0.016 1.474 0.044 1.518 0.016 1.483 
Services 0.013 0.761 -0.001 1.178 0.013 0.764 0.000 1.188 
Total Export             
Primary -0.037 1.582 -0.022 1.780 -0.035 1.713 -0.020 1.800 
Heavy Industry -0.088 4.085 -0.039 2.668 -0.085 4.264 -0.038 2.687 
Light Industry -0.075 3.542 -0.032 3.030 -0.070 3.771 -0.030 3.059 
Energy -0.118 2.225 -0.057 1.998 -0.115 2.402 -0.055 2.019 
Services -0.034 1.985 -0.018 2.602 -0.028 2.220 -0.015 2.636 
Physical investment             
Primary 0.182 1.924 0.064 1.631 0.188 1.974 0.070 1.642 
Heavy Industry 0.076 1.902 0.012 1.681 0.083 1.959 0.017 1.693 
Light Industry 0.054 1.156 0.003 1.246 0.059 1.191 0.008 1.256 
Energy 0.110 1.525 0.030 1.443 0.115 1.569 0.035 1.454 
Services 0.059 1.286 0.004 1.331 0.064 1.325 0.009 1.342 
Rate of return to knowledge.             
Primary 0.073 -6.618 0.020 -0.756 0.077 -6.411 0.024 -0.711 
Heavy Industry 0.070 -4.845 0.020 -0.583 0.074 -4.656 0.023 -0.549 
Light Industry 0.085 -8.013 0.020 -2.060 0.088 -7.917 0.023 -2.030 
Energy 0.146 -9.205 0.062 -3.493 0.146 -9.160 0.063 -3.475 
Services 0.043 -11.401 0.008 -4.427 0.043 -11.392 0.009 -4.409 
Value added price             
Primary 0.023 -0.944 0.013 -1.055 0.021 -1.021 0.012 -1.066 
Heavy Industry 0.034 -1.426 0.015 -0.966 0.033 -1.483 0.014 -0.972 
Light Industry 0.032 -1.442 0.014 -1.241 0.030 -1.531 0.013 -1.253 
Energy 0.083 -1.539 0.040 -1.384 0.081 -1.659 0.039 -1.398 
Services 0.017 -0.988 0.009 -1.289 0.014 -1.103 0.008 -1.305 
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Real wages in the long run return to their initial position because the 
unemployment rate returns to its initial level. The purchasing power of 
workers moves to zero change through an endogenous process by which 
in-migration reduces the fall in the unemployment rate, thereby limiting 
the rise in the real wage as regional employment expands. The fall in CPI 
reduces nominal wages, making labour cheaper than in the national 
bargaining case. 
In order to evaluate whether the policy has produced some sectoral 
structural change, the percentage change with respect to the initial steady 
state of the share of sectoral output on total output is reported in Figure 3. 
An increase in output share for an economic sector implies that it will 
grow faster than the rest of the economy as a result of the subsidy. We 
see that for the NB scenario, the sectoral share of Heavy industry 
experiences the largest change in the long run. Although substantially 
less than Heavy industry, the other sectors benefiting are Primary, Light 
industry and Energy. On the other hand, Service sector shows a 
significant drop in its share of total output.  
Within the regional bargaining simulation, Heavy industry still remains 
the sector that, more than any other, benefits from a rise in R&D 
investment. Contrary to the national bargaining scenario, Energy moves 
from positive change in the short run to negative change in the medium 
and long run.  
 
 
Figure 3 
Sectoral structural change - percentage change with respect to the initial 
steady state- Regional  Bargaining  and National Bargaining                                        
           
a)Regional Bargaining: share of sectoral output on total output                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 b)Bational Bargaining: 
 
External knowledge spillover effect
 
In this section, we analyze the capacity of 
achieve a superior growth if interregional and international knowledge 
spillovers are incorporated in
that in the preceding subsection. The only difference is that we allow for
a shift in production through 
productivity level in the model depends on domestic and foreign R&D 
capital stock. When the ratio of domestic 
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As pointed out by Coe and Helpam (1995), the accumulation of 
knowledge stock would increase the capacity of a country to gain larger 
spillovers from innovation developed in the rest of the world. However, 
our results suggest that policies seeking to enhance the long-run rate of 
regional economic growth by increasing the regional stock of knowledge 
are not able to generate large cross-border technological spillovers or at 
least not as large as we would expect. To some extent, similar 
conclusions have also been found in the model developed by Diao et al. 
(1999) for the Japanese economy.   
The model results show that the difference in the long run rate of GRP 
growth between the spillover and no-spillover cases is about 0.1056 
percentage points when wages are bargained nationally, and 0.0153% for 
wages bargained locally. This means that, cross-border spillovers are 
positive and rise over time, as shown in Figure 4, but with different 
intensities between the two closures. Indeed, for all periods, the spillover 
effect is greater with national bargaining than with regional bargaining. 
This does explain why, in national bargaining, the GRP increases more 
with than regional bargaining.  
The intensity of knowledge spillover is not so high as to significantly 
affect the long-run growth in both closures because its contribution to 
productivity is marginal.  
In the short run, the rise in production has to be met by an increase in 
imports, and the capacity of the region to acquire external spillovers is 
also driven by negative terms of trade which depress exports and 
encourage imports. However, the level of spillover is limited as the 
increase in production is subject to constrained factors of production. In 
the medium and long runs the reverse situation prevails. Expansion in 
production leads to a positive shift in the share of imports but the 
resulting increase in efficiency generates positive terms of trade (so 
exports rise relatively more than imports) that partially offset the 
potential spillover contribution to productivity.   
One more cause of the small magnitude of the external spillover effect 
may lie in the characteristics of the Sardinia economy. It can be seen that 
in the initial benchmark equilibrium, the share of imports from high 
technological countries, such as BA, is quite low (0.03%, see Table 2 
above). BA is the country with, not only the highest amount of R&D 
stock, but also with the greatest spillover elasticity.  As the total level of 
imports from the ROW is split amongst countries with a Leontief 
function, no substitution effects amongst regional imports occur in this 
simulation. In Table 5 below we show the evolution of imports share for 
the six countries considered by the model. For both closures the share of 
imports from BA declines. This is happening because Sardinia mainly 
imports services from North America, but intermediate input services, 
although positive in the short run, assume negative variation in the long 
run. 
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For the regional bargaining scenario, the share of imports is also negative 
for EU and ROI. This explains why the change in the external spillover is 
lower than the national bargaining figures. 
 
Table 5 - Imports share for the six countries considered by the model 
(percentage change from base year value) 
 
 
 
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
In the preceding simulations we used best guess estimate for the elasticity 
parameter, . Where  = A − 1/A  and A was set equal to 0.3. Table 5 
shows results from further analysis. We measure the sensitivity of R&D 
investments by changing the value of A since variation in the factor 
substitutions can be seen as key determinants of the cost of R&D policy. 
By running the model with long run time periods we attempt to 
determine the level of R&D investment needed to reach a pre-determined 
level of growth (as in the previous analysis this is set to 1.44) for 
different values of A.  We only show results for the regional bargaining 
labour market closure. 
By inspecting Table 6, we see that the percentage increase in R&D 
investment is lower when we allow for external knowledge spillover 
effect. For the default case (A = 0.3), in order to reach a proportionate 
increase in GRP of 1.4407 in the long run, R&D investment must rise by 
4.487% (as in the previous simulation) and 4.4179% when external 
knowledge spillover are taken into account. When we recalibrate the 
model, for increasing values of elasticity of substitution, the percentage 
increment (from base year value) of R&D investments rises; with an 
increasing substitution effect, firms find it convenient to substitute 
knowledge for physical capital and labour, since expansion in R&D 
investment lowers the Knowledge rental rate.  
National Bargaining
1 10 20 30 40 50 LR
EU 0.009 0.411 0.426 0.391 0.363 0.345 0.310
AFC 0.006 0.620 0.748 0.738 0.717 0.701 0.670
NA 0.008 0.016 -0.080 -0.137 -0.171 -0.192 -0.230
SA 0.010 0.149 0.177 0.157 0.132 0.113 0.075
ASA 0.004 0.559 0.708 0.705 0.686 0.670 0.639
OCE 0.003 0.574 0.739 0.739 0.721 0.705 0.675
ITA 0.009 0.166 0.160 0.140 0.123 0.111 0.088
Regional Bargaining
1 10 20 30 40 50 LR
EU 0.005 0.167 0.106 0.056 0.027 0.008 -0.024
AFC 0.003 0.314 0.396 0.400 0.393 0.387 0.374
NA 0.005 -0.057 -0.219 -0.302 -0.345 -0.370 -0.414
SA 0.004 0.090 0.100 0.085 0.069 0.058 0.037
ASA 0.002 0.303 0.431 0.455 0.457 0.456 0.450
OCE 0.001 0.316 0.467 0.502 0.508 0.508 0.507
ITA 0.004 0.069 0.025 -0.007 -0.026 -0.038 -0.059
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Table 6 - Results from sensitivity analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this work our intention is to understand the important role played by 
knowledge capital as a factor in regional development. To fully exploit 
the foreign R&D capital stock requires a regional production structure 
with a strong manufacturing sector with high intensity of intangible 
capital. However, in the past ten years, Sardinia has experienced an 
intensive deindustrialization process, especially in the Heavy industry 
sector. Therefore it might be beneficial to change the production structure 
by making manufacturing the leading sector in order to accommodate 
R&D policies. 
We have also seen that the region may benefit from its openness (in the 
interregional and international trade market) if it is able to exploit the 
knowledge embodied in imported goods. This depends on the capacity of 
the regional system to internalize the technological level embodied in 
imported goods. We show that the endogenous productivity effect that 
occurs in response to external spillovers is quite modest. Furthermore, 
the type of wage setting really matters in this model. The output effect 
due to induced technical change is greater when wage setting is 
bargained locally.  
The model we have presented is just a first attempt to evaluate the 
macroeconomic consequences of R&D financial aid. Indeed, such 
analysis would require a more sophisticated analysis of the degree of 
economic integration and the introduction into the model of New 
Economic Geography elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             ρ No Spillover  Spillover 
0.3 2.22 2.20 
0.6 2.72 2.57 
0.9 3.18 2.88 
1.5 4.05 3.46 
2.0 4.77 3.94 
3.0 6.21 4.87 
4.0 7.68 5.81 
5.0 9.18 6.76 
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Appendix A 
 
The mathematical presentation of the model 
 
 
Prices 
&hC,L = ­L ∙ &HhC ∙ 1 + h®C (A.1) 
&gC,L = ­L ∙ &HgC ∙ 1 − gC (A.2) 
&®C,L = &%C,L ∙ %C,L + &gC,L ∙ gC,L%C,L + gC,L  (A.3) 
&¯C,L = &%C,L ∙ %C,L + &hC,L ∙ hC,L%C,L + hC,L  (A.4) 
&e%,L = 	 %C,,LC ∙ &%,L + 	 eC,,LC ∙ &ettt	 e%C,,LC  (A.5) 
&D,L ∙ kO = °&®,L ∙ <1 − a'kj − a − ±;¡= − , kC,² &¯,LC ³ (A.6) 
´µL = &eJL ∙ ^¶ +  (A.7) 
&µL·¸ = , , ,88 ∙ &¯,L·¸   (A.8) 
7L = 7L1 + [;; + [;¶ ∙ 1 + ^¶; (A.9) 
 
7kx; ;''^/x ¹%º »  ./ - 7L&µL3 = £ − ¤ ∙ ./LJº »  7L = 7L¼© 
½ 
 
(A.10)
¶¾,L = &D,L ∙ y ∙ <,L=¿À ∙ 0D,L,L1
¿À
 (A.11)
¶ℎ,L = &D,L ∙ 8 ∙ <,L=¿À ∙ 0 D,Lr,L1
¿À
 (A.12)
&eJL = 	 &¯,L ∙ 	 hC,C 	 	 hC,C  (A.13)
&eJrL = 	 &¯,L ∙ 	 DhC,C 	 	 DhC,C  (A.14)
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Production technology 
 
®C,L = ^/ 0DC,LkCO ; C,,LkC,² 1 (A.15)
DC,L = kCO ∙ ®C,L (A.16)
C,L = kC,² ∙ ®C,L (A.17)
DC,L = <C,L= ∙ `CyC,L +  C8rC,L +  CNC,L b   (A.18)
C,L = <1 + C,L= ∙ ( (A.19)
L = ,  ∙  ∙ ./ 0	 rd,Ldttttttt 1 (A.20)
,L = 	 	 h%gf,,L	 h%gf ,,L  (A.21)
,L =  <,L= ∙ N ∙ &D,L7L ¢
À ∙ D,L (A.22)
Trade  
C,,L = ÁC,ÂÂ ∙ C,ÂÃhC,LÄ +  C,ÂCe%C,LÄ Ä  (A.23)
hC,,Le%C,,L = -0C,ÂÃC,ÂC1 ∙ 0&e%C,L&hC,L 13
Ä
 (A.24)
e%C,,L = ÁC,ÂC ∙ C,ÂCeC,LÄ +  C,Â%C,LÄ Ä  (A.25)
%C,,LeC,,L = -0C,ÂC,ÂC 1 ∙ 0 &eC,L&%C,L13
Ä
 (A.26)
,L = , C,,LC  (A.27)
%,L = , %C,,LC  (A.28)
e,L = , eC,,LC  (A.29)
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h,L = , hC,,LC  (A.30)
h%gf,,L = Å,ÆÇ·ÈÈÉÊ ∙ h,L     ¶ ∈  Ìµ, g´, d, Íµg, J, d Îe,L    ¶ ∈ %Íe       ½ (A.31)
gC,L = gtC ∙ 0&gC,L&%C,L1
·Ï
 (A.32)
hC,L = , eC,,L + , hC,,L + , ¯rhC,8,L8 + ¯fhC,L + ¯eC,L + ¯hC,L (A.33)
µL = , hC,LC ∙ &hC,L − , gC,L ∙ &gC,LC + ­L ∙ Ð , %ghttttttt¥ÑÇCÑ\¥ÑÇCÑ\ +  gttttÒ (A.34)%C,L = , %C,,L + , ¯r%C,8,L + ¯%C,L + ¯f%C,L + ¯rC,L8  (A.35)
®C,L = %C,L + gC,L (A.36)
Domestic Institutions 
DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L = ±¥ÑÇCÑ\E ∙ 7L ∙ , CC + ±¥ÑÇCÑ\F ∙ ¶¾C,L ∙ , CC + ±¥ÑÇCÑ\8 ∙ ¶ℎC,L ∙ , rCC  + , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L +¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó &µL ∙ %f¥ÑÇCÑ\ + ­L ∙ %gh¥ÑÇCÑ\ 
(A.37)
%d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L = &µL ∙ %dttttttt¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó (A.38)
d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L = ¡¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∙ DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L (A.39)
rµL = , DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∈ ÌÎ − , d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∈ ÌÎ − r®L− , , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,8,L8¥ÑÇCÑ\  
(A.40)
¯rC,8,L = C,8 ¸ ∙ 0&µC,L&¯C,L1
¸ ∙ rµL (A.41)
¯rC,8,L = ÁC,8 ∙ C,88 ∙ ¯r%C,8,LÄ + C,88Ã ∙ ¯rhC,8,LÄ   Ä (A.42)
¯r%C,8,L¯rhC,8,L = -0 C,88C,88Ã1 ∙ 0&hC,L&%C,L 13
Ä
 (A.43)
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fÍºL = , ¯fC,L ∙ &¯C,L + fdtttttttC + &µL∙ , %f¥ÑÇCÑ\,L − ±Çy ∙ , ¶¾C,L ∙ C,LC¥ÑÇCÑ\ + ±Ç8 ∙ , ¶ℎC,L ∙ rC,LC+ , ehC,LC + r®L + gtttt ∙ ­L 
(A.44)
¯fC,L = ¯fttttC (A.45)
¯fC,L = ÁCÇ ∙ CÇ ∙ ¯f%C,LÄ + CÇÃ ∙ ¯fhC,LÄ   Ä (A.46)
¯f%C,L¯fhC,L = -0 C
ÇCÇÃ1 ∙ 0&hC,L&%C,L 13
Ä
 (A.47)
¯C,L = , hC, ∙ ,L (A.48)
¯C,L = ÁCÂ ∙ CÔÂÃ ∙ ¯hC,LÄ + CÔÂC ∙ ¯e%C,LÄ   Ä  (A.49)
¯hC,L¯e%C,L = v°C
ÔÂÃCÔÂC³ ∙ 0&e%C,L&hC,L 1w
Ä
 (A.50)
¯e%C,L = ÁCÂC ∙ CÔÂC ∙ ¯eC,LÄ + CÔÂ ∙ ¯%C,LÄ   Ä  (A.51)
¯e%C,L = ÁCÂC ∙ CÔÂC ∙ ¯eC,LÄ + CÔÂ ∙ ¯%C,LÄ   Ä  (A.52)
¯%C,L¯eC,L = v°C
ÔÂCÔÂC ³ ∙ 0 &eC,L&%C,L1w
Ä
 (A.53)
¯rC,L = , DhC, ∙ %,L (A.54)
Investments 
eC,LdC,L = F ∙ 0 ¶¾C,L[¾C,L1
Õ
 (A.55)
C,L = eC,L -1 + £C2 ∙ eC,LBC,L3 (A.56)%C,L = ~ ∙ `rdC,L∗ − rdC,Lb +  ∙ rdC,L 
Or %C,L = %C,L¼© ∙ 1 + Öa (A.57)
Factors accumulation (A.58)
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dC,L = 1 − F ∙ dL + eC,L 
 
Short Run dC,L = dC,L¼© 
 
Long Run eC,L¼E! = F ∙ dL¼E! 
 
(A.59)
rdC,L = 1 −  ∙ rdL + %C,L 
 
Short Run rdC,L = rdC,L¼© 
 
Long Run %C,L¼E! =  ∙ rdL¼E! 
 
(A.60)
dL = 1 + /^L ∙ dL 
 
Short Run dL = dL¼© (A.61)
/^L =  − [./L − ./ t +   -./   7L[¡^L¢ − ./ 0 7[¡^13 (A.62)
C,L = dC,L (A.63)
rC,L = rdC,L (A.64)
dL ∙ 1 − L = , ,L  (A.65)
Taxes and subsidies (A.66)
eºC,L = a'kjC ∙ ®C,L ∙ &®C,L (A.67)
eh,L = , h® ∙ hC,,L ∙ &hC,LC  (A.68)
d´ºdDC,L = d´ºC ∙ ®C,L ∙ &®C,L (A.69)
r®L = , ±'¶88 ∙ [; + [;¶ ∙ , ,L ∙ 7L  (A.70)
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Glossary 
 
 
i,j the set of goods or industries 
ins the set of institutions 
dins ⊂ ^/ the set of domestic institutions 
dngins ⊂ ±^/ the set of non government institutions 
h ⊂ ±/x^/ the set of households 
r the set of regions 
  
Prices 
 &®C,L output price &DC,L value added price &%C,L regional price &¯C,L commodity price &e%C,L national commodity price (regional + ROI) &eC,L ROI price  ¶¾C,L rate of return to tangible capital ¶ℎC,L rate of return to intangible capital (knowledge) 7L  unified nominal wage 7L  after tax wage &eJL  capital good price &eJrL  capital knowledge price [¾L user cost of physical capital [ℎL user cost of tangible capital &µL aggregate consumption price ­L exchange rate  
  
Endogenous 
Variables  
 
  ®C,L total output %C,L Regional supply hC,L total import gC,L total export (interregional + international) DC,L value added C,L scale factor in CES function C,L labour demand C,L demand of physical capital rC,L demand of Knowledge  dC,L physical capital stock rdC,L knowledge stock dC,L labour supply C,L intermediate inputs %C,L regional intermediate inputs hC,L ROW intermediate inputs e%C,L national intermediate inputs (regional+ROI) eC,L ROI intermediate inputs h%gf,L intermediate import from region r ¯f%C,L regional government expenditure 
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¯fhC,L government expenditure from ROI+ROW rµL aggregated household consumption ¯rC,8,L total households consumption in sector i for h  ¯r%C,8,L regional consumption in sector i for group h ¯rhC,8,L import consumption in sector i for group h ¯C,L total investment by sector of origin i ¯%C,L regional investment by sector of origin i ¯hC,L ROW investment ¯e%C,L national investment (REG+ROI) ¯eC,L ROI investment ¯rC,L R&D investment by sector of origin i e,L investment by sector of destination j ,L investment by destination j with adjustment cost %,L R&D investment by sector of destination j r,L∗  optimal level of knowledge stock L regional unemployment rate /^L net in migration L external knowledge spillover L import share in the knowledge spillover function d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L domestic non government saving DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L domestic non government income %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L transfer among dngins r®L  total household tax µL current account balance d´ºdDL  production subsidies fÍºL government balance 
  
Exogenous variable  
  dtttttt,L R&D stock of region r %ghtttttttL remittance for dngins gttttL remittance for the Government ¯fC,L government expenditure fdL government saving 
  
Elasticities:    between knowledge and tangible inputs in sector j ACØ of export with respect to terms of trade CI in Armington functions ¤ of real wage with respect to unemployment rate Ù  of acc. rate with respect to the real shadow price  of non-excludable H with respect to foreign R&D AÆÇ       elasticity of substitutions of imported import from country r 
  
Parameters  kC,²   input output coefficients for i used in j kO   share of value added on production y.8,N  shares in value added function in sector j C,ÂC,ÂÃ,Â,ÂC   shares parameters in Armington function for intermediate 
goods C,ÔÂC,ÔÂÃ,ÔÂ,ÔÂC   shares parameters in Armington function for investment             
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C,88,8Ã    shares parameters in Armington function for investment in 
R&D              CÇ,ÇÃ    shares parameters in Armington function for Government 
consumption ÁC,ÂÂ,ÂC   shift parameter in Armington functions for intermediate 
goods ÁC  shift parameter in Armington function for households 
consumption  ÁCÇ  shift parameter in Armington function for government 
consumption  F,  rate of depreciation for KS and HS ~  Speed of adjustment in R&D investment function £C   adjustment cost in tangible investment function a'kjC   business tax aC   rate of production subsidy h®C   rate of import tax DhC,   Yale Technology Matrix hC,  physical capital matrix ¡¥ÑÇCÑ\  rate of saving in institutions dngins 
ssce rate of social security paid by employees 
sscer rate of social security paid by employer 
ire rate of income tax 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
CE model. The ill-specified SAM+R&D provide the prior distribution 
coefficient [(C, and data on column sum j.We minimize the entropy 
distance E between the prior [(C, and the new estimated coefficient matrix [C,: 
 
 
 
h^/ g = s, , [C,./ [C,[(C,C u 
 
(B.1) 
Subject to:  , [C,j = iC   (B.2) , [C, = 1C         k/±     0 < [C, ≤ 1  (B.3) 
 
Where iC is the resulting sum in row. Considering k aggregates 
constraints and an n-by-n aggregator matrix G, we can write: 
 , , xC,y 'C,C = Áy   (B.4) 
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where 'C, is the SAM transaction matrix and Áy is the value of the 
aggregate constraints. With equation (B.4) we introduce in the set of 
constraints, some aggregated macro-control variables to deal with 
intangible components when these are allocated to the sub-matrices of 
the RSAM seen in Table 1: F, YF, S and I. The macro-control variables 
allow us to consider the intangible components as already part of the 
SAM maintaining at the same time the original aggregated figures. 
 
 
Appendix C 
The method to obtain the physical capital matrix KMi,j 
 
The physical capital matrix KMi,j has been derived by means of a doubly 
constraint minimum information (MI) model (Schneider and Zenios, 
1990). Let T denote the total amount of investment and for each j, let e 
be the investment by sectors of destination and ¯Ú the investment by 
sectors of origin i. Considering 'C, the model estimated probabilities and 
some prior probabilities '(C,, the model can be formalized as follow: 
 Min   , , tÚ,ÛÛÚ -ln 0tÚ,Ût(Ú,Û1 − 13 
subject to , tÚ,Û = IÛTÚ ;   , tÚ,Û = QVÚTá ; 
where , , tÚ,Û =ÛÚ , QVÚÚ = , IÛÛ = T 
 
 
In this problem as we do not have previous capital matrix concerning 
Sardinia the prior probabilities '(C,are derived from the Italian matrix 
estimated by Costa and Marangoni (1995) for the year 1985. The 
investment by destination are supplied by the regional account system 
(ISTAT, 2004) whilst the investment by origin are provided by the 
RSAM. 
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Equilibrium Model: does the forward-looking 
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An Applied Regional Intertemporal General 
Equilibrium Model: does the forward-looking 
model fit the usual regional closures? 
 
 
 
Abstract. We present a stylized regional intertemporal forward-looking model able to 
take into account regional economic features, an area where the literature is not well 
developed. The main difference, from the standard applications, is the role of saving and 
its implication for the balance of payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-
looking behaviour for agents, the rate of private saving will be exogenously determined 
and so no neoclassical financial adjustment is needed. Also, we focus on the similarities 
and the differences between myopic and forward-looking models, highlighting the 
divergences among the main adjustment equations and the resulting simulation 
outcomes.   
 
JEL classification: C68; D91; R10 
 
Keywords: Myopic and Forward-looking Behaviour; Computable 
General Equilibrium Models; Regional Adjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
CGE models based on myopic expectations have been criticised by the 
supporters of forward-looking models because of the intertemporal 
inconsistency involved in assuming backward-looking expectations. The 
models solve complex optimization problems within periods in order to 
determine the best allocation of resources, however, between periods 
they remain myopic, with consumption, saving and investment decisions 
abstracting from future periods (Devarajan and Go, 1999). Some doubts 
also arise when the policy to be evaluated has intrinsic long run effects 
(e.g. trade liberalization policy). As noted by Go (1994), Devarajan and 
Go (1999), and Dissou (2002), myopic models fail to capture dynamic 
policy gains and, consequently, produce both inaccurate and incorrect 
results. For example, Devarajan and Go (1999) demonstrate that the 
welfare gains of eliminating trade tariffs are greater in forward-looking 
models than in static models
9
. 
The theoretical structure of many intertemporal forward-looking CGE 
models is that described in Abel and Blanchard (1983). Such a model can 
be solved as a decentralized economy where consumption decisions are 
                                                 
9
 Also see Dellink (2005) on  environmental policy   
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made by intertemporal optimizing households, and savings and 
investment decisions are separated. The sectoral financial balance 
equilibrium is maintained, either through adjusting foreign borrowing, 
the interest rates, or by means of fiscal policy that, in turn, affects the 
financial wealth of households. Firms’ forward-looking behaviour 
influences their investment decisions which depend on the tax-adjusted 
Tobin’s q. Furthermore, in their stylized form, such models usually make 
households fully liable for the financial needs of the system. Hence, 
household savings would cover, not only the needs of domestic 
investment, but also eventually, trade and Government deficits. 
Accordingly, households have to save as much as is required to clear the 
financial sector which, in turn, implies the imposition of a balance of 
payments constraint.  
In fact, forward-looking models are frequently calibrated on national 
data and their specification is nowadays becoming standardized. 
However, a slavish application of specifications that imply a zero balance 
of payments, and where the savings rate is obtained endogenously 
through sectoral financial balance equilibrium, may be inappropriate in a 
regional context since regions may differ from the country as a whole.  
It is widely recognised that regions are more open than nations and that 
these economies do not have full macroeconomic power. Both monetary 
and fiscal policy are centralized, therefore target policies and some 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms whose incorporation is 
uncontroversial in a national model, cannot be applied to the case of a 
region
10
. Furthermore, regions, unlike nations, do not face a balance of 
payments constraint. We can identify at least two reasons for this. Firstly, 
balance of payments is not required as a policy target since regions 
usually belong, both to a common currency area, and to a nationally 
integrated financial system. As a result, fiscal and monetary policies 
cannot be used to produce balance of payments adjustments through 
control variables such as exchange rates, reserve assets and interest rates. 
Secondly, the subvention that regions receive from higher level 
authorities such as centralized Government and the EU, may cause some 
distortionary effects so that a rigorous theory of the composition of the 
balance of payments is not really a regional issue. As pointed out by 
McGregor et al. (1995), such subventions are key determinants of the 
trade deficit in the region.  
The point is that forward-looking models impose a balance of payments 
equilibrium in order to maintain financial sector sustainability, but 
regions are not obliged to undergo any form of financial adjustment. For 
instance, if a region faces an unsustainable position in which a net 
foreign debt is accompanied by a persistent trade deficit, it is not required 
to adopt rigorous adjustment in order to produce a trade surplus to cover 
                                                 
10
Even though some nations are likely to behave as regions (European countries for 
example). 
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interest payments because there are no superior authorities to impose it. 
A superior institution such as central Government, may reduce the 
subvention to reduce its level of debt and, in turn, the region’s debt (that 
is unobservable). However, this is a process that happens outside of the 
region. It means that if any adjustment exists this is imposed 
exogenously, from outside the region, not as an endogenous mechanism. 
This also means that the Ricardian implication of the fiscal deficit usually 
embedded in consumers’ optimal decisions might be unrealistic; regional 
Government cannot finance its expenditure by levying taxes or issuing 
bonds since regional policy is an exogenous variable that depends on the 
subvention received from outside the region.    
Of course, given widespread movement towards greater devolution 
within the EU, more regions will be equipped with instruments to deal 
with the reduction in subvention, thereby introducing specific sustainable 
targets that might bring about a partial endogenous financial adjustment 
operating within the region. So, only when regions start to behave like 
countries belonging to a common currency area, e.g. the European 
countries, does the balance of payments begin to be a matter for the 
regional level, and any adjustment in internal and foreign assets ceases to 
be exogenously determined. This does not mean that the traditional 
approach to the balance of payments should be applied. Also for these 
regions, interregional and international payments constraints should not 
necessarily be imposed. 
We think that the treatment of internal and external debt should differ 
from the usual application in intertemporal models. Thus, in a stylized 
regional model, Government and external debt with their correspondent 
flows, internal and external deficits, should not be involved in the process 
that determines financial adjustment. This also means that the role of 
savings should differ from standard applications. In a region, the 
household savings decisions are independent of the regional financial 
system. In fact, it is more likely to be affected by national adjustment 
which is, of course, exogenous in a single small open regional economy 
model.  
The intertemporal model developed in this paper maintains forward-
looking behaviour for both households and firms, and investment and 
saving decisions are kept separate. However, unlike standard 
applications, in our formulation savings follow the Solow-Swan 
assumption so that the rate of savings is exogenous. This does not 
prevent the absolute level of savings from varying through time. 
Comparisons between myopic and forward-looking models are required 
and under particular circumstances we find the same long run steady state 
equilibrium. Furthermore, these comparisons may be very useful since it 
would seem that in the literature the intertemporal forward-looking 
model has generally been compared to the simple static case that lacks 
any capital adjustment rule. Independently of the dynamic structure, 
forward-looking and myopic regional models should incorporate a 
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separate investment function and the investment decision must be 
determined independently of the savings decision. Instead, in several 
papers an intertemporal model has been compared with a simple myopic 
one in which investment is either roughly assumed fixed to the base year 
or is passive. The myopic model used in this example, which follows the 
usual AMOS closures (McGregor et al. 1995, 1996), allows investment 
to respond to the current rate of return to capital. In addition the analysis 
will be enriched by assuming labour supply adjustment through 
migration, and by investigating the role of different labour market 
closures.  
The paper continues in Section 2 with the outline of the model. In 
Section 3 we deal with the calibration method, whilst Sections 4 and 5 
are devoted to a discussion of the main outcomes of the simulations. 
Finally, Section 6 is a conclusion. 
 
 
2. Model Description 
A single-region dynamic CGE model is presented in this section. The full 
mathematical presentation of the model is in Appendix (A.1 - A.77).  
Production and demand parameter specifications have been 
implemented through the well known calibration method using the Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Sardinia for the year 2001 (Ferrari et al., 
2009). The set of prices at which excess demand is zero is the result of an 
optimization process where market clearing prices equal marginal costs 
in each sector. 
Three economic activities or sectors are considered: Primary, 
Manufacturing and Services. No distinction is made between traded and 
non-traded sectors. Sardinia is a very small open economy and almost all 
sectors compete in the interregional and international markets. Even 
health care services, traditionally a sheltered sector, are now inter-
regionally traded. Intermediate and primary inputs constitute the 
production inputs. The model also includes three domestic institutional 
sectors: Firms, Households and Government. External institutions are 
split into the Rest of Italy (ROI) and Rest of the World (ROW). We adopt 
assumptions typically used for a small open economy. The region is too 
small to affect prices in international and interregional markets and, as a 
consequence, the ROI and ROW prices are taken to be exogenous. The 
behaviour of Households and Firms is based on intertemporal 
optimization with perfect foresight. Government is a consolidated sector 
merging central and local Government levels whose expenditure can be 
either the result of an optimization process, where Government is simply 
treated as a new consumer maximizing utility subject to the budget 
constraints, or it is held constant in real terms.   
 
Production. The model’s production structure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Intermediate inputs (VV), labour (L) and capital (K) constitute the 
 production inputs of the model. 
production function in order to produce value added, 
substitution among primary factors of production (A.17). The demand for 
L and K is obtained from the first order condition of profit maximization. 
This means that the demand for both 
volume of value added, 
and w, respectively). 
(A.14), so the combination of value added and intermediate inputs can be 
shown with an L-shaped isoquant. Intermediate goods produced locally 
or imported are considered as imper
regional and imported goods under the so called Armington assumption 
through a CES function. The demand function for regionally produced 
and imported intermediate inputs (from ROI and ROW) derives from the 
solution of a cost minimization problem (A.19
commodities supply is bought by industries and by domestic and external 
institutions (A.24). That is to say, each industry in the region produces a 
composite commodity that can be exported or sold in the regi
market. An export demand function closes the model where the foreign 
demand for Sardinian goods depends on the terms of trade effect and on 
the export price elasticity (A.23). 
 
The production structure of the model
 
 
Investment. This follows Hayashy (1982) with the rate of investment as a 
function of marginal 
(VF) to the replacement cost of capital 
that are quadratic in investment and linear homogeneous in investment 
and capital stock, so for a positive shock, the economy does not adjust 
                                        
11
 As we are assuming that the firm is price taker, the marginal 
q. For more detail see 
Capital
(K)
64 
L and K are combined in a CES 
Y, allowing for 
K and L is positively related to the 
Y, and is a decreasing function of their prices (
Leontief technology between VV and Y is imposed 
fect substitutes. Basically, we mix 
-A.22). Regional 
 
Figure 1 
 
q (or average q)
11
, the ratio of the value of firms 
Pk·K. There are adjustment costs 
         
q is equal to the average 
Hayashy (1982).  
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instantaneously to the desired level of capital stock. Accordingly, firms 
respond to the shock by making continuous small investments over time. 
The dynamic path of investment is the result of an intertemporal 
programme that seeks to maximize VF subject to the capital 
accumulation equation,   (A.50). The value of firm, VF, is given by the 
present value of the net income or cash flow, CF, that is to say, the 
capital income âC,L less investment expenditure C,L. The investment 
expenditure equation (A.45) is defined as a function of the adjustment 
cost ãjL (A.48) as in Devarajan and Go (1998), Go (1994) and Hayashi 
(1982). The solution to this intertemporal problem
12
 produces the time 
path of investment (A.46) along with the law of motion of the costate 
variable ~ (A.47). 
 
Consumption. Individuals optimise their lifetime utility function of 
consumption, C (A.26) subject to a lifetime wealth and time constraint.  
Once the optimal path of consumption is obtained from the solution of 
the intertemporal problem (A27), aggregate consumption is allocated 
within each period and between different groups through a CES function 
(A.34). Household demand for regional and imported goods (A.35 and 
A.36) is the result of the intra-temporal cost minimization problem. 
According to the dynamic budget constraint, the discounted present value 
of consumption must not exceed total household wealth, W. The model 
distinguishes between financial wealth (FW) and non financial wealth 
(BFW). So total Wealth, W, is given by: 
  HL = JHL + HL 
 
The NFW accumulate as follow: 
 JHL1 + ¶L = JHLä + DL  
 
where YL is the net labour income plus transfers of income from internal 
and external institutions. FW, unlike in the standard applications, is 
accumulated through saving, S as follows: 
 
                                                 
12
 The optimality conditions (or the canonic system which gives the system of 
differential equations in the optimal control problem) are given by the first order 
condition of the Hamiltonian in current value: 
 
A. 
åå = 0 ⇒ ′eL = ~L 
B. ~ = − ååF  ⇒  ~ = ¶L + ~L − %Ly 
C. limL»∞ ¤L~LL = 0 (trasversality condition) 
 
The canonic system [A, B and C] can be solved to yield the costate variable in terms of 
discounted future revenue of capital which in turn leads to equation (5). More detail 
about the dynamic solution can be found in Go (1994) and Devarajan and Go (1999).  
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HL1 + ¶L = HLä + Πç − Sç ( 1 ) 
and  
  dL = ¡ ∙ DrL 
 
where Πç is capital income, DrL is total household current income whilst 
mps is a parameter calibrated from the SAM. This way of proceeding, 
although allowing us to deal with an exogenous rate of household saving, 
is wholly consistent with forward-looking consumption behaviour. In 
fact, consumption still depends on lifetime income. That is to say, 
consumers base consumption decisions on expected future income, and 
although saving is not affected by investment and from the current 
account situation, it still allows the consumers to smooth consumption 
across periods. In the traditional approach, financial wealth is obtained 
by assuming asset equilibrium so that financial wealth accumulates 
according to the following: 
 
HL1 + ¶L = HLä + Πç − °, C,L +C èL − ºL³ ( 2 ) 
 
Where FD is the fiscal deficit and TB is the trade balance. Then 	 C,L +C èL − ºL  gives us endogenous saving. This means that 
household financial wealth is equal to total assets, internal and external. 
That is to say: 
 HL = , C,L + fèL + èLC  ( 3 ) 
 
In others words the wealth derived from asset holdings consists of the 
value of firms (VF), public assets (GD) and foreign assets (D). The value 
of firms represents the wealth generated from assets that consist of 
domestic firms’ shares. Foreign assets reflect holdings of foreign firms’ 
shares. The value of public assets is derived from Government bonds 
issued to finance the fiscal deficit.  
In our formulation, as described in equation (1), the balance of 
payments still clear and we do not need to impose any balance of 
payments adjustment because the total absorption equation is sufficient to 
guarantee equilibrium in the payments account since we are not 
considering money as a commodity. In contrast, implicit in equations (2) 
and (3) is the imposition of a balance of payments adjustment because 
savings are determined endogenously according to the financial needs of 
the regional system. This method is incoherent if a regional context is 
considered. As we have said in the introduction, it is plausible that the 
regional savings rate depends very much on the national system and, 
unlike countries, there is no saving-investment association. Furthermore, 
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regions are unlikely to face a balance of payments problem because the 
multiregional capital market is highly integrated and capital moves freely 
across regions.  
In other intertemporal models household savings have also been 
determined as a fixed share of income, as for instance in Go, (1994). He 
exploits Abel’s and Blanchard’s (1983) equivalence to delete the 
household budget constraint, solving the model as a centralized economy 
but imposing financial sector equilibrium and making foreign borrowing 
endogenous. We can also run the model as a master plan, not considering 
the motion equation of the state variable W (see Section 4). 
 
Domestic private Assets. From Hayashi’s (1982) work we know that if 
the firm is a price taker, then marginal q is equal to average q. Therefore 
we can specify the shadow price of capital ~ as the ratio of the value of  
the firm VF to its capital stock K (A.59).  
 
Foreign and public assets. The common hypothesis is that both internal 
and external debt accumulates over time in accordance with the level of 
deficit and interest payments. Moreover, terminal conditions for assets 
are imposed in order to avoid Ponzi games. As many CGEs are calibrated 
on a steady state equilibrium, the need to maintain a sustainable position 
may generate a dataset that does not reflect the real situation of the 
region. For instance, the calibration of the foreign asset/debt is derived by 
imposing regional sustainability with respect to foreign creditors or 
debtors. In doing this, if the regional SAM registers a trade deficit, we 
need to impose (and suppose) that, in the past, the region has run in 
surplus for many years in order to accumulate assets; the presence of a 
trade surplus should imply foreign debt. But several regions are in a 
permanent Ponzi game condition. If we do not take this situation into 
account, the quantitative nature of the results may change. So, if foreign 
debt accumulates according to the following: è = ¶èL + ºL and the 
trade balance TB is positive (so a trade deficit), a sustainable long-run 
position should require interest-bearing foreign assets held by the private 
sector. Alternatively, a negative TB (trade surplus) in the long run would 
be able to cover interest payments on any outstanding foreign debt. In a 
regional context we may suppose, instead, that capital inflows necessary 
to cover the trade deficit are partially constituted by subvention on which 
no interest is paid and that, therefore, will not reduce internal assets 
because these are resources coming free of charge. In Sardinia’s case, 
trade deficits exist on both the interregional and the international side. 
Sardinia is a region that receives extensive subvention from the EU and 
the Italian Government: any payments from the Social or Structural funds 
of the EU are matched by the National Government. In these 
circumstances it would seem that the causality relationship, according to 
which the current account balance determines financial and capital 
account, is inverted; capital inflow that is free of charge drives the trade 
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deficit, where such capital inflows are free of charge and not determined 
by the desire of an investor to acquire Sardinia assets. In this case the 
change in debt that may affect the sectoral financial balance should be 
net of this capital inflow. In modelling this situation we may assume that 
a proportion of debt, é, is the amount of subvention that the region 
receives from the National Government or EU, and not because there is 
the desire to invest in the region:  
 è = ¶ − éèL + ºL 
 
So the debt accumulates only if º > −¶ − éèL and the net foreign 
debt is equal to the gross debt less the accumulated subvention on the 
assets in the gross debt. 
As regards Government debt or assets, because Sardinia experiences an 
internal deficit, according to the usual calibration that imposes 
sustainability of fiscal deficits, we would need to suppose the presence of 
Government assets which reduce the total assets available for private 
agents. However for the same reasons, as explained above, we consider 
an “unsustainable” position as one in which the debt is going to 
accumulate net of the resources that the region receives from outside of 
the region (A.62).  
 
Labour market regimes and labour supply. The model incorporates three 
labour market closures defining the form of wage setting: regional wage 
bargaining (RB), national bargaining (NB) and fixed real wage, (FRW). 
The wage-setting functions are defined below, where w is the nominal 
wage, cpi is the consumer price index, £ is a parameter calibrated to the 
steady state and u is the regional unemployment rate. ­ is the elasticity of 
wages related to the level of unemployment rate and it can also be 
interpreted as an index of wage flexibility. 
 
 
Wage setting
íîï
îð./  7L[¡^L = £ − ­ lnL  Regional Bargaining7L[¡^L = 7L¼©[¡^L¼©                Fixed Real Wage 7L = 7L¼©                           National Bargaining
½ 
 
In the regional wage bargaining regime, the labour market is defined by 
the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) according to which 
wages and unemployment are negatively related.
13
Thus regional wages 
are directly related to workers’ bargaining power and respond to excess 
demand for labour. NB is a Keynesian closure for traditional regional 
                                                 
13
 See application of this closure in McGregor et al. 1995 and 1996. 
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economies. It assumes that the nominal wage is fixed at the base year 
level. We can imagine that the regional nominal wage is fixed at the 
value of the national wage due to a national bargaining regime. For that 
reason this closure rule could be called National Bargaining (Harrigan et 
al. 1991). FRW is used to obtain an alternative counterfactual analysis. 
We hypothesise that the purchasing power of wages remains stable over 
time.  
As regards demographic developments and labour supply, we assume 
that there is no natural population change but the labour force adjusts 
through a migration model commonly employed in AMOS (Harrigan et 
al.1996, McGregor at al. 1996). The model starts with zero net migration 
flow and, in any period, migration is taken to be positively related to the 
gap between regional and national ( w
B
/cpi
B
 ) real wages, and negatively 
related to the gap between national, (u
B
) and regional unemployment 
rates: 
 /^L =  − [lnL − ln t +   -./   7L[¡^L¢ − ./ 0 7: [¡÷tttt13 ( 4 ) 
 
where nim is the rate of net migration and  is a parameter calibrated in 
order to get zero net migration.  and  are elasticities that measure the 
impact of the gap between regional and national unemployment and real 
wage rates. 
 
 
3. Calibration 
The model calibration process assumes the economy to be initially in a 
steady state equilibrium. The parameters of the models are obtained from 
the SAM by means of the usual calibration method. Since, in a 
deterministic approach, some of the parameters remain unspecified, we 
need to find them from outside the model, so the elasticities of 
substitution and other behavioural parameters are based on econometric 
estimation or best guesses. For all sectors, trade elasticities are set equal 
to 2 whilst production elasticities are equal to 0.3. The wage curve 
elasticity is set to -0.033, following to a recent econometric estimation 
reported in Devicienti et al. (2008), whilst in the migration function, we 
use the elasticities commonly used in AMOS and econometrically 
estimated by Layard et al. (1991).  
The values of adjustment cost parameters
14
 Ù and £ in equations (A.46-
9) are assigned values 0 and 1.5, respectively. The World interest rate is 
set to 0.04, the rate of depreciation to 0.07 and the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.5. Given the value of total 
                                                 
14
 In many applications the parameter Ù  is set to zero. The value of £ is set to 0.9 in 
Dissou (2002) in a model of Senegal and in Go (1994) and Devarajan and Go (1999) in 
their model of Philippine is set at 2. 
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investment, J, as supplied by the System of National Accounts (ISTAT, 
2005) through the capital matrix
15
, KMi, j, the equality condition with 
total investment by origin in the SAM holds true. The price of capital 
goods, Pk, is set equal to unity since the benchmark prices on the 
consumption side are set equal to one. W corresponds to the discounted 
flow of current income, BFW to the discounted flow of net labour 
income, and FW is obtained by maintaining asset equilibrium. By 
imposing equality
16
 between the rate of return to capital rk and the user 
cost of capital
17
, uck,  from the constraint equations (A.28), A(.40), 
(A.45-49), (A59) and (A.62-67), we obtain consistent values for the 
variables I, K, ~, W, BFW and FW. 
The model is solved by applying the usual procedure in solving an 
infinite time horizon model, by imposing steady state conditions at a 
specific point in time. In the first periods we impose factor constraints in 
order to see short-run impact; however the transitional pathway is the 
result of the discrete time solution of the model.  
The myopic model developed here,
18
 and which is compared with the 
intertemporal model, is not obtained recursively, rather the equations of 
the model are solved simultaneously for a given finite time horizon. 
Since the model does not incorporate jumping variables the results are, of 
course, those of the recursive one. In addition, the model incorporates an 
adjustment cost function through which investment is determined 
independently of savings. The adjustment rule introduced in the myopic 
model follows that employed in AMOS (McGregor et al., 1996) which is 
consistent with the neoclassical formulation developed in Jorgenson 
(1963) and Eisner-Stroz (1963); the optimal path of investment is derived 
through the accelerator mechanism >: 
 e = > [∗ −  
 
where ∗ is the desired level of capital. This is wholly compatible with 
the Uzawa formulation of adjustment cost where the investment capital 
ratio (  ) is determined by the rate of return to capital (rk) and the user 
cost of capital (uck), allowing the capital stock to reach its desire level in 
a smooth fashion over time: 
   =  ¶¾, [¾     
    ¶¾ > 0;  [¾ < 0     
                                                 
15
 For detail about the construction of the Sardinian capital matrix, see Garau and Lecca 
(2008). 
16
 The equality between rk and uck is necessary since we are proposing the same 
calibration method for the myopic and the intertemporal model.  
17
 Given that the interest rate and the depreciation rate are fixed, the user cost of capital 
depends on the variation of the capital good price, Pk.  
18
 For a full list of equations of the myopic model see Garau and Lecca, 2008.  
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Although Uzawa’s formulation and the q theory proposed by Tobin are 
formally different, they are in essence “equivalent,” as noted in Hayashi
19
 
(1982).  
The myopic model can also be run for two static conceptual time 
closures: the Short-Run (SR) and the Long-Run (LR). In the SR, capital 
and labour supplies are fixed at their base year value; in the LR, factor 
constraints are relaxed allowing for complete capital and labour 
adjustment. Capital stock is at its optimum level, with rental rate equal to 
user cost of capital. With regard to the labour supply, the population is 
fully adjusted so that the system exhibits zero net migration. This kind of 
adjustment is quite similar to the ones presented in AMOS, a CGE for 
Scotland (McGregor et al., 1996). 
 
 
4. Simulation strategy 
We present several simulations in order to compare different forward-
looking model specifications (which are declared by an FL prefix). 
Comparisons between forward-looking and myopic models (MYP prefix) 
are also carried out. In all simulations the disturbance takes the form of a 
10% increase in interregional exports. We prefer a simple demand shock 
since the paper is not policy oriented, but its aim is to highlight the main 
differences in the adjustment mechanism that may arise by changing the 
dynamic structure of the model and some household closure rules.  
We present the proportionate changes from base year values for a set of 
key economic variables in Tables 1 and 2 for the intertemporal and 
myopic model, respectively. In the tables, only the short run and long run 
results are reported, along with outcomes related to different labour 
market regimes: Regional Bargaining (RB), National Bargaining (NB) 
and Fixed Real Wage (FRW). The main difference between FL1 and 
MYP1 and FL2 and MYP2 is in the financial adjustment process and its 
implication for the balance of payments.  
In FL1 we try to design a hypothetical stylized regional intertemporal 
model in which, not only is the balance of payments trivial, but 
household saving decisions do not involve any financial adjustment 
process. We are aware that this may change the nature of the 
intertemporal model. However, as we have explained above, in a regional 
economic framework it does not seems appropriate to incorporate 
                                                 
19
 This equivalence allows Hayashy to integrate the two theories deriving a rate of 
investment function of q. 
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household saving decisions in the manner usually applied in 
intertemporal models, as in eq. (2). The outcomes obtained can also be 
replicated by running the model as a centralized solution by exploiting 
Abel’s and Blanchard’s equivalence (Abel and Blanchard, 1983). Such a 
solution has also been used in Go (1994) to remove the household budget 
constraint. As a result, this reduces the dimensions of the problem. Go 
thus closes the model by imposing equality between total savings and 
investment through adjustment in the level of foreign borrowing. 
However, this is not our method. We may exploit Abel’s and Blanchard’s 
(1983) equivalence to delete the motion equation of the state variable W 
and resolve the problem as a centralized economy as in Go (1994), but 
without imposing financial sector equilibrium. This is consistent with a 
regional macroeconomic framework in which the constant savings rate 
(Solow-Swan assumption) does not involve an adjustment of the private 
sector financial balance, as seen above. That is, regional private assets, 
Government and foreign borrowing do not take part in determining the 
consumer’s intertemporal decisions (compared with e.g. Devarajan and 
Go, 1999, Go, 1994 and Dissou, 2002). Such a specification does not 
prevent the consumer from behaving with perfect foresight. Indeed, 
consumers still take decisions on the basis of future wealth, preserving 
the condition of instability between current consumption and wealth 
during the transitional pathway. Of course, in the long run, the 
trasversality condition is satisfied and stability restored. 
MYP1 represents the traditional myopic regional model. This model, as 
noted above, is quite similar to the type of adjustment present in AMOS 
(McGregor et al. 1996). Household savings are a fixed proportion of 
income and consumption is obtained from a simple budget constraint 
equation.  
In FL2 households are responsible for all of the financial needs of the 
regional system, so their financial wealth is related to outstanding foreign 
debt, the value of firms and Government debt, as specified in eq. (3). We 
are assuming that the Government is financing the debt by issuing bonds 
that are borne exclusively by households. Since saving and investment 
are separately determined, the equilibrium condition is obtained through 
foreign savings, which enters into the household consumption decision 
and allows us to avoid fiscal policy, given that there is no borrowing 
constraint. In this case, the balance of payments is no longer trivial. 
However, the imposition of sectoral financial equilibrium is equivalent to 
the imposition of a balance of payments constraint which requires saving 
to adjust in order to satisfy the intertemporal payment constraint.  
In order to make a comparison with a myopic formulation, in MYP2 not 
only the balance of payment holds, moreover we attempt to emulate the 
same financial adjustment that would occur in FL2. In doing so the 
household budget constraint equation and the financial balance 
equilibrium are included in the myopic model. Of course in this case, 
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household consumption becomes endogenous and the value of firm is 
calculated using the capital rental rate obtained within each period.  
For all models, three labour market closures (Regional Bargaining, 
National Bargaining and Fixed Real Wage) are analysed. Furthermore, 
all models are run in order to generate an endogenous updating of the 
working population through migration (see eq. 4). Indeed, imperfect 
labour markets and labour supply adjustment obtained through the 
introduction of quantity signals (given by the unemployment rate), and 
migration, are key factors in regional economic models. Such elements 
make regional models different to their national counterparts where the 
wage is often flexible and the labour supply is exogenous. 
 
 
5. Simulation results 
From Tables 1 and 2 we immediately note that, in the long run, for all 
closures and in all cases we obtain Leontief-type results (see McGregor 
et al., 1996), characterized by changes in quantity and zero change in 
prices. This reflects the complete adjustment of factors of production. 
Indeed, both capital and labour endogenously adjust over time. Capital 
stock increases with investment which in turn, is affected by its real 
shadow price. As aggregate demand rises, prices increase and so do 
firms’ profit expectations. This leads to an increase in investment that is 
moderated by the replacement cost of capital reflected in the real shadow 
price. In-migration increases in response to a rise in real wages and 
falling unemployment until, in the long run, the labour market is cleared, 
and all the increase in employment is covered by the increase in working 
population. In turn, the growth in labour supply puts downward pressure 
on wages until the labour market is in long run equilibrium, the real wage 
is restored to its original level, and goods’ prices adjust totally. 
From the tables we can also see that there are no differences in the long 
run impact between myopic and forward-looking models (LR: 
FL1≡MYP1 and FL2≡MYP2). This equivalence arises because, in our 
myopic model, consumption is passive and results from the budget 
constraint. Its value should equal that obtained in forward-looking 
models given that, in the long run, the transversality condition are 
satisfied, consequently eliminating divergences between current income 
and current consumption. On the investment side of the forward-looking 
model, the accumulation rate adjusts totally as Tobin’s q equalizes. Such 
a situation corresponds, in the myopic formulation, to zero gap between 
desired and actual level of capital (if we adopt a Jorgenson-type 
adjustment) or that the change in the rate of return to capital equals that 
of the user cost of capital (if Uzawa-type adjustment are applied). 
 
5.1. Fixed saving rate. We begin by analysing simulation results from 
the intertemporal model FL1. As we are analysing three labour market 
closures, the main differences between these models are driven by wage 
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dynamics. However, wage behaviour affects only the short run and the 
transitional path since, in the long run, labour supply adjustment allows 
the economy to reach Leontief-type results. In the first period of RB, 
which corresponds to the short run solution, the demand stimulus 
increases labour demand which reduces the unemployment rate by 1.34% 
increasing, as a consequence, the bargaining power of workers and so the 
real wage (0.05%). For the national bargaining case, the real wage is 
below its initial equilibrium (-0.91%). As workers cannot bargain wages 
within the region, the increase in aggregate demand raises prices, thereby 
lowering the purchasing power of wages. In the FRW, the real wage is 
fixed, so the increase in the consumer price index increases the nominal 
wage by the same amount (1.11%).  
Given that in NB workers cannot bargain their wages, the level of 
employment and the reduction in the unemployment rate is greater than 
for the RB and FRW cases. Furthermore, as the price of goods adjusts 
according to the wages dynamic by making the supply smoothly 
responsive, the analysis of the transitional path suggests that the capacity 
to reach the new steady state faster will depend on the speed of price 
adjustment. In NB prices adjust faster than in RB and FRW because 
nominal wages are fixed, implying less resistance to reaching their long 
run equilibrium, as we can see from Figures 2 and 3. 
In the short-run, the increase in interregional exports is not enough to 
cover the rise in total imports. The total trade deficit increases and for all 
labour market closures the ROI trade deficit improves while the ROW 
deficit gets worse. This is happening as the exogenous increase in 
interregional exports raises competitiveness with respect to the Rest of 
Italy, but the augmented aggregate demand generates an increase in 
production that needs to be satisfied by increasing the demand for import 
goods. This is driven also by the increase in regional prices. The result is 
a substitution effect which lowers ROW exports and raises ROW 
imports. In the long-run, as prices adjust totally back to their benchmark 
values, the terms of trade effect is nullified, generating complete 
variation in interregional exports (10%) and zero change in international 
exports. So, as imports are increasing to satisfy production needs, the 
international current account get worse, generating, however, a total 
positive effect (current account ROI+ROW, -3.14%) given that part of 
the interregional current account improves by 17.87%.  
In the first period, household consumption increases only in NB 
(0.10%). For RB and FRW the proportionate change is negative. This is 
the distinctive impact we would expect in an intertemporal model that 
incorporates permanent income type behaviour; it implies that when 
households make decisions on current consumption, they take into 
consideration their future earnings, thus creating instability between 
current income and current consumption. Such instability disappears in 
the long-run where the change in consumption equals the positive 
variation in total wealth (1.48%). 
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Change in the real shadow price drives the impact on investment which 
rises in the short run, settling in the long-run at a level of 2.03% higher 
than the initial steady state. The reason is that the increase in exports 
affects domestic goods prices, raising profit expectations for firms in 
every sector. Indeed, in the first period we see that the change in the 
shadow price of capital is greater than the change in the capital goods 
price. Furthermore, change in investment is greater in NB than in FRW 
and RB (J: NB>FRW>RB). The reason can be identified in the variation 
of the replacement cost of capital which is higher in RB (1.08%) and 
lower in NB (0.86%). The NB case is less sensitive to factor constraints 
because workers do not have the power to re-establish their purchasing 
power (see real wage, -0.91%) under centralized wage bargaining, 
leading to less upward pressure on the prices of consumption goods.  
With regard to sectoral impacts, all three sectors receive permanent 
benefits. Breaking down the commodity composition of total exports 
although the primary sector makes up the smallest share of total exports, 
it seems to be the sector that has the largest proportionate gains in terms 
of real output and investment, both in the short run and in the long run. 
Since the policy analyzed here is a simple demand side shock, the initial 
steady state coefficients matter for the long run outcome. As a matter of 
fact, exports represent 28% of primary sector output compared to 12% in 
Manufacturing and 2% in Services.  
By comparing the results with the myopic case we see that, as expected, 
they exhibit the same long run equilibrium. Indeed, we recall that in both 
models, investment is responsive to the rate of return to capital and its 
increase is tempered by adjustment costs that are incorporated into both 
models. The second reason is due to the fixed rate of savings 
incorporated in both intertemporal and myopic cases. The transitional 
pathway towards the long run may differ since, in the myopic model, 
agents’ expectations are based on the past, whilst in the forward-looking 
model both consumption and the shadow price of capital depend on 
future conditions.  
If we look at the GRP charts in Figure 4, for RB and FRW it seems that 
FL1 achieves the steady state equilibrium faster than MYP1. In fact the 
FL1 GRP curve from the Medium term to the long run is above that of 
MYP1. However, in the short run we have a different situation (see also 
Table 2 and 3); for NB, the GRP MYP curve is always above the FL 
GRP curve. Of course, the results are strongly conditioned by the 
parameters of the models. In the myopic model the accelerator (the 
adjustment parameter applied to the gap between actual and desired level 
of capital stock) in the investment function, set to 0.5, drives the speed of 
adjustment; in the forward-looking model the speed of adjustment is 
particularly affected by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, here 
equal to 1.5, that generates consumer preferences between periods (see 
the next subsection 5.3 on this point). 
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In order to understand these differences it is helpful to chart the path of 
those variables subject to forward-looking behaviour, namely 
consumption and investment (Fig. 5). For all labour market closures, the 
proportionate changes in consumption for the first periods are greater in 
MYP1 than FL1. For instance, in the Regional Bargaining case, only 
after the 30
th
 period does consumption in the intertemporal model exceed 
that in the myopic model. As regards the pattern of investment, we see 
that for all closures but NB, the percentage change in FL1 is greater than 
MYP1 for every period. Investments appear rather interesting in the NB 
case. In FL1 investment jumps immediately to about 3.09 times the 
benchmark level and gradually comes to rest at 2.03% in the long run, 
producing a percentage curve convex to the origin. Indeed in the SR, 
given capital constraints, the shadow price of capital increases relatively 
much more with respect to the prices of capital goods because the latter 
experiences less upward pressure from wages which are fixed. Usually, 
the intertemporal model is compared to the myopic model in which 
investment is passive and roughly determined by available savings 
expressed as a fixed share of income. Here instead, the behaviour of 
investment is quite similar in both the myopic and the forward-looking 
models. 
 
5.2. Endogenous saving rate. The difference between FL1 and FL2, on 
the one hand, and MYP1 and MYP2 on the other, rests on savings 
behaviour. Indeed, the rate of saving in FL2 and MYP2 is endogenous, 
affected by the variations in the value of the firm, Government and 
outstanding foreign debt. However, we do not find much difference with 
respect to the previous case (FL1) as far as the direction of the effect is 
concerned. This is true even for price adjustment which seems quite 
similar to FL1, as does the impact of different labour market closures. 
The price of domestic goods drives up the increase in full consumption 
price and the capital goods price. Price adjustments seem more affected 
by the wage dynamic, as in the previous case, than by the balance of 
payments equilibrium constraint.  
The main difference with respect to FL1 and MYP1 is the intertemporal 
constraint present in FL2 which leads to payments equilibrium through 
sectoral financial flows, in all periods that, in turn, impose a balance of 
payments adjustment constraint according to which savings depends on 
domestic and foreign financial assets. According to our experiment this 
has the effect to invert the behaviour of saving in the short run and to 
raise the long-run impact of an increase in competitiveness. 
 In the short run for all labour market regimes (see Table 1, FL2) the 
rate of saving fall due to the rise in trade deficit and Government deficit. 
In fact although investment is increasing this is not able to 
counterbalance the negative behaviour of the internal and external 
balance. So, the intertemporal constraint makes households decisions part 
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of the regional financial mechanism even though for a region is difficult 
to see this kind of mechanism in operation. The composition of the 
In the long-run, we have a bigger impact in terms of real variables in 
FL2 than in FL1. The Gross Regional Product is above its benchmark 
equilibrium by 2.06% in FL2 and 1.91% in FL1. Such differences are 
driven by consumption which is greater in FL2 (1.85%) than FL1 
(1.48%). So the long-run difference between the two models is due 
substantially by consumption which in turn is affected by total wealth.  
Wealth increased more in FL2 than in FL1. Wealth, in fact, is 
composed of NFW and FW. NFW is determined in the same way in both 
models but FW is the result of different specifications. In FL2, the 
increase in assets also raises total wealth, and consumption is positively 
affected. Consequently, household financial wealth increases as the value 
of the firm is above its benchmark equilibrium (1.97%), and the decrease 
in Government debt (-1.54%) is not able to offset the fall in foreign debt 
(-2.77%). The change in total assets is positive (see Fig. 6a). This will 
affect consumption since, in the long run, the instability between current 
wealth and consumption disappear.  
Surprisingly, the same type of adjustment is also obtained in MYP2, the 
myopic counterpart of FL2. First, in the short run, the rate of saving fall 
for the same reason explain above and furthermore the long-run impact 
coincide with FL2. Results for MYP2 can be seen in Table 2 while the 
behaviour of savings and wealth for the forward-looking and myopic 
models can be seen in Figure 6a and 6b. In both models, savings fall in 
the initial periods and then rise. Financial Wealth rise immediately in the 
first period and then decrease (maintaining positive change) because 
foreign debt rises. As soon as foreign debt get negative change the 
financial wealth curve rise gently tempered by negative change of 
Government assets hold by households.  
This path analysis confirm that no difference in adjustment and impact 
exist in both model MYP and FL. Previous literature has emphasis the 
incapacity of myopic model to produce consistent results based on 
rational behaviour. In our experiments instead we prove that both models 
may reproduce similar behaviour for the main macroeconomic variables 
since we have made the effort to render both models close to each other.   
 
5.3. Sensitivity analysis. As we have seen above, the only difference 
between myopic and forward-looking models is in the transitional 
pathway towards a new steady state. In particular, due to the 
characteristics of both models, two parameters are able to govern and 
alter the speed of adjustment: the myopic model is highly sensitive to the 
parameter, >, in the investment equation, whilst the inverse of the 
constant elasticity of marginal utility 1/A is the parameter that more than 
any other alters the rate at which the new steady state equilibrium is 
reached.  
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As in the preceding simulations, even here we increase interregional 
exports by 10% using the MYP1 and the FL1 models by changing the 
parameters > and A. As seen from Figure 7, increasing > the curve of the 
proportionate change in the accumulation rate tends to approach the 
stable point (zero change) rapidly. Given that capital stock accumulates 
over time due to past net investment, a positive shock produces a growth 
of GRP generating a large gap between desired and actual K. This causes 
current net investment to rise. This rise in investment will increase with 
the parameter >, thereby increasing the speed of adjustment of the 
accumulation rate.  
In Figure 8 we report the percentage change of consumption obtained 
by changing the value of A. Given an intertemporally additive utility 
function, the Euler equation for expected utility maximization under 
rational expectations implies that, by increasing the value of the marginal 
utility of consumption and keeping fixed the sacrifice of not consuming 
(the interest rate), the cost of reallocating consumption between the 
present and the future will decrease. So changing A, we modify the cost 
of reallocating consumption between periods that, according to the 
figures, imply that, for a positive shock, consumption will reach faster 
the new steady state when A is high or its inverse is low (1/A).  When A 
is equal to 0.5 and 0.4, consumption in the very first periods assume 
negative change due to the fact that households prefer to save in these 
periods and allocate more consumption to future periods.  
 
 
6. Final comments 
Since regional CGE models are often based on a recursive dynamic 
structure and the lack of forward-looking expectation has been stressed 
as an important drawback of such models (Partridge and Rickman, 1998; 
2008) the focus of this paper is to produce a simple stylized forward-
looking model applicable in a regional context, given that a mechanical 
and slavish application of the usual mechanism and closures applied in 
intertemporal CGE model would misrepresent the adjustment 
mechanisms that might occur in a region. Of course, we do not have the 
presumption to say that we have given an answer, but at least we have 
posed a problem.  
Our main conclusion is that intertemporal consumer optimization, based 
on neoclassical or Fisherian analysis of intertemporal resource allocation, 
seems to be inappropriate from a regional point of view. Consumer 
intertemporal maximization process yields, not only the time path of 
consumption, but also the time path of savings which became a function 
of total financial assets. Thus, not only the instability between current 
income and current consumption related to the permanent income 
hypothesis approach are under discussion, but more emphasis is put on 
the dynamic path of savings where households are liable for all the 
financial needs of the region. In turn, this implies an imposed balance of 
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payments adjustment mechanism. Furthermore, we argue the plausibility, 
from a regional point of view, of the imposition of an intertemporal 
budget constraint where internal and external debts are made repayable 
from the private sector. No internal and external debt sustainability 
problems occur in a region. Deficit in the current account cannot be seen 
as hypothetical surplus in later periods making external debt repayable 
because there is no requirement to do so, and foreign debt, especially for 
declining regions, is the result of capital subvention supplied by supra-
regional institutions, such as a national Government or the European 
Union. Regional public deficit is not a problem at all. It would, therefore, 
be a mistake to allow consumers to take the public deficit into account in 
their intertemporal optimization problem, as no taxes will be imposed to 
cover it and no change in consumption plans is required. As we have said 
above, regional policy is an exogenous variable for regions so no 
Ricardian equivalence of fiscal deficit would be considered.  
We have also argued that some of the objections, such as the presumed 
lack of capital adjustment in the myopic model and differences in long 
run steady state results, cannot be correct. In some articles, forward-
looking models are compared with myopic specifications that preclude 
any adjustment in investment and consumption. The usual assumptions 
are passive investment (or investment held constant to the base year in 
real terms) and consumption simply obtained as a fixed share of current 
income. In this paper, both models are quite close to each other and the 
intertemporal and the myopic model generate the same results in the 
long-run. The only difference is in the transitional pathway where 
consumption and investment might diverge: perfect foresight agents have 
rational expectations whilst myopic foresight agents take decisions 
according to adaptive expectations and so make no intertemporal 
preferences between periods on future profits and incomes. Furthermore, 
from the sensitivity analysis we show that the transitional path may be 
affected by the two adjustment parameters present in the myopic (> and 
forward-looking models (A. In the myopic model we have just a cost 
adjustment equation in investment while in the forward looking model 
we have two cost adjustment equations, one in investment and the other 
in consumption. The latter can be interpreted in fact as a flexible 
accelerator mechanism (like for investment) where the parameter that 
govern the intertemporal preferences, 1/A can also be seen as an 
adjustment parameter. This is the main structural difference between the 
myopic and forward looking models presented in this paper.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Forward-Looking models. The short-run and long-run impact of 
10% increase in interregional export under three different labour market 
closures and three types of financial sector adjustment. Percentage 
change with respect to the initial staedy state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Long-Run Long-Run
RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW
GRP Factor Cost 0.039 0.247 0.049 1.859 0.044 0.273 0.055 2.060
Consumer Price Index 1.114 0.918 1.107 0.000 1.231 1.014 1.223 0.000
Unemployment Rate -1.337 -8.431 -1.671 0.000 -1.496 -9.335 -1.871 0.000
Total Employment 0.149 0.937 0.186 1.956 0.166 1.037 0.208 2.155
Nominal Wage 1.159 0.000 1.107 0.000 1.282 0.000 1.223 0.000
Real Wage 0.045 -0.910 0.000 0.000 0.050 -1.004 0.000 0.000
Replacemnet cost of capital 1.073 0.861 1.065 0.000 1.193 0.959 1.184 0.000
Government Deficit -0.004 -0.414 -0.025 -1.452 0.044 -0.409 0.021 -1.575
Labour Supply 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.956 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.155
Households Cons -0.184 0.105 -0.174 1.480 0.006 0.326 0.017 1.849
Households Saving 1.302 1.389 1.309 1.407 -2.033 -2.215 -2.160 0.806
Financial Wealth 3.496 5.195 3.714 3.985 5.299 4.870 5.301 8.342
Non Financial Wealth 1.164 1.220 1.174 1.333 1.283 1.344 1.294 1.469
Total Wealth 1.292 1.439 1.314 1.480 1.505 1.539 1.516 1.849
Gov. Expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Current Account ROI+ROW 0.140 0.937 0.215 -3.143 0.893 1.772 0.975 -2.629
Current Account ROI -10.746 -9.771 -10.639 -17.873 -9.567 -8.494 -9.451 -17.120
Current Account ROW 7.302 7.982 7.356 6.550 7.776 8.526 7.835 6.905
Investment 1.077 3.087 1.212 2.026 1.157 3.373 1.305 2.224
Value added
Primary 0.963 1.797 1.002 4.980 0.916 1.837 0.959 5.130
Manufacturing 0.327 1.034 0.363 3.184 0.317 1.098 0.357 3.371
Services 0.002 0.454 0.023 1.473 0.021 0.520 0.045 1.678
Interregional exports
Primary 6.279 6.934 6.306 10.000 6.147 6.869 6.177 10.000
Manufacturing 6.112 6.340 6.110 10.000 5.881 6.134 5.879 10.000
Services 7.520 8.140 7.544 10.000 7.186 7.870 7.214 10.000
International exports
Primary -3.382 -2.788 -3.358 0.000 -3.503 -2.846 -3.475 0.000
Manufacturing -3.534 -3.327 -3.536 0.000 -3.745 -3.515 -3.746 0.000
Services -2.255 -1.691 -2.233 0.000 -2.558 -1.937 -2.533 0.000
Investment demand
Primary 2.772 5.792 2.997 3.184 2.711 6.034 2.958 3.371
Manufacturing 1.117 3.147 1.253 2.052 1.193 3.432 1.344 2.250
Services 0.841 2.729 0.965 1.872 0.938 3.022 1.076 2.072
Shadow price of capital
Primary 2.331 2.790 2.372 0.000 2.400 2.906 2.446 0.000
Manufacturing 1.611 1.981 1.647 0.000 1.720 2.126 1.759 0.000
Services 1.111 1.199 1.122 0.000 1.258 1.355 1.270 0.000
Value added price
Primary 2.071 1.698 2.055 0.000 2.149 1.736 2.131 0.000
Manufacturing 1.652 1.561 1.654 0.000 1.760 1.659 1.762 0.000
Services 1.163 0.868 1.151 0.000 1.322 0.996 1.309 0.000
FL1 FL2
Short-Run Short-Run
81 
 
Table 2 - Myopic models. The short-run and long-run impact of 10% 
increase in interregional export under three different labour market 
closures and three types of financial sector adjustment. Percentage 
change with respect to the initial steady. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Long-Run Long-Run
RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW
GRP Factor Cost 0.049 0.308 0.061 1.859 0.044 0.267 0.055 2.060
Consumer Price Index 1.338 1.137 1.328 0.000 1.226 0.987 1.216 0.000
Unemployment Rate -1.666 -10.522 -2.084 0.000 -1.514 -9.117 -1.891 0.000
Total Employment 0.185 1.169 0.232 1.956 0.168 1.013 0.210 2.155
Nominal Gross Wage 1.394 0.000 1.328 0.000 1.278 Eps 1.216 0.000
Real Gross Wage 0.056 -1.124 0.000 0.000 0.051 -0.977 0.000 0.000
Capital Good Price 1.307 1.088 1.296 0.000 1.193 0.937 1.182 0.000
Government Deficit 0.115 -0.366 0.092 -1.452 0.068 -0.377 0.046 -1.575
Labour Supply 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.956 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.155
Households Cons 0.272 0.731 0.293 1.480 0.087 0.379 0.105 1.849
Households Saving 1.587 1.749 1.595 1.407 -1.107 -0.257 -1.078 0.806
Financial Wealth 3.838 5.562 4.015 3.985 3.433 3.141 3.424 8.342
Non Financial Wealth 1.225 1.246 1.227 1.333 1.191 1.266 1.199 1.469
Total Wealth 1.369 1.485 1.381 1.480 1.315 1.370 1.322 1.849
Gov. Expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eps
Current Account ROI+ROW 1.370 2.546 1.425 -3.143 0.661 1.268 0.701 -2.629
Current Account ROI -8.842 -7.349 -8.772 -17.873 -9.951 -9.301 -9.903 -17.120
Current Account ROW 8.089 9.057 8.135 6.550 7.643 8.223 7.678 6.905
Investment 0.816 3.180 0.928 2.026 0.756 2.775 0.857 2.224
Value added
Primary 0.867 1.881 0.915 4.980 0.912 1.819 0.956 5.130
Manufacturing 0.281 1.144 0.322 3.184 0.292 1.047 0.329 3.371
Services 0.047 0.616 0.074 1.473 0.029 0.512 0.053 1.678
Interregional Exports
Primary 6.031 6.797 6.068 10.000 6.158 6.897 6.193 10.000
Manufacturing 5.751 5.984 5.762 10.000 5.968 6.297 5.982 10.000
Services 6.847 7.479 6.877 10.000 7.164 7.901 7.196 10.000
International Export
Primary -3.608 -2.911 -3.575 0.000 -3.493 -2.821 -3.461 0.000
Manufacturing -3.863 -3.651 -3.853 0.000 -3.665 -3.366 -3.653 0.000
Services -2.866 -2.292 -2.839 0.000 -2.578 -1.908 -2.549 0.000
Investment demand
Primary 1.553 4.798 1.707 3.184 1.605 4.454 1.745 3.371
Manufacturing 0.835 3.216 0.948 2.052 0.778 2.813 0.879 2.250
Services 0.703 2.964 0.810 1.872 0.629 2.550 0.725 2.072
Rate of return to capital
Primary 5.203 8.307 5.349 0.000 5.284 8.028 5.418 0.000
Manufacturing 2.777 5.659 2.912 0.000 2.710 5.171 2.832 0.000
Services 1.645 3.275 1.722 0.000 1.430 2.717 1.496 0.000
Value added price
Primary 2.216 1.778 2.195 0.000 2.142 1.720 2.122 0.000
Manufacturing 1.819 1.729 1.814 0.000 1.718 1.581 1.712 0.000
Services 1.485 1.182 1.471 0.000 1.333 0.981 1.318 0.000
MYP 1 MYP2
Short-Run Short-Run
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Figure 2 
Gross Regional Product, Model FL1 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Consumer Price Index, Model FL1 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
Gross Regional Product: a comparison between  FL1 and MYP1 
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Figure 5 
Consumption and Investment  
 
a) Consumption and Investment Regional bargaining model FL1 and MYP1 
 
 
b) Consumption and Investment Bational bargaining model FL1 and MYP1 
 
 
 
c) Consumption and Investment Fixed real wage model FL1 and MYP 
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Figure 6 
Financial wealth and household savings 
 
a) Model FL2 
 
 
b) Model MYP2 
 
 
Figure 7 
Accumulation rate for different value of the speed of adjustment 
 
85 
 
Figure 8 
Consumption for different value of A 
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APPEDIX 
 
 
 
The mathematical presentation of the model 
 
Prices  
&hC,L = ­L ∙ &HhC ∙ 1 + h®C (A.1) 
&gC,L = ­L ∙ &HgC ∙ 1 − gC (A.2) 
&®C,L = &%C,L ∙ %C,L + &gC,L ∙ gC,L%C,L + gC,L  (A.3) 
&¯C,L = &%C,L ∙ %C,L + &hC,L ∙ hC,L%C,L + hC,L  (A.4) 
&e%,L = 	 %C,,LC ∙ &%,L + 	 eC,,LC ∙ &ettt	 e%C,,LC  (A.5) 
&D,L ∙ kO = °&®,L ∙ <1 − a'kj − a − ±;¡= − , kC,² &¯,LC ³ (A.6) 
´µL = &¾L ∙ ^¶ +  (A.7) 
&µL·¸ = , , ,88 ∙ &¯,L·¸  (A.8) &xø>L·Ê = , Ç ∙ &¯,L·Ê  (A.9) 
7L = 7L1 + [;; + [;¶ ∙ 1 + ^¶; (A.10) 
 
Wage setting
íîï
îð./  7L[¡^L = £ − ­ lnL  Regional Bargaining7L[¡^L = 7L¼©[¡^L¼©                Fixed Real Wage 7L = 7L¼©                           National Bargaining
½ 
 
(A.11) 
¶¾,L = &D,L ∙ y ∙ <,L=¿À ∙ 0D,L,L1
¿À  (A.12) 
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&¾L = 	 &¯,L ∙ 	 hC,C 	 	 hC,C  (A.13) 
Production technology  
®C,L = ^/ 0DC,LkCO ; C,,LkC,² 1 (A.14) 
DC,L = kCO ∙ ®C,L  (A.15) 
C,L = kC,² ∙ ®C,L (A.16) 
DC,L = <C,L= ∙ `Cy ∙ C,L + CN ∙ C,L b ¿ (A.17) 
,L =  <,L= ∙ N ∙ &D,L7L ¢
À ∙ D,L (A.18) 
Trade  
C,,L = ÁC,ÂÂ ∙ C,ÂÃhC,LÄ +  C,ÂCe%C,LÄ Ä  (A.19) 
hC,,Le%C,,L = -0C,ÂÃC,ÂC1 ∙ 0&e%C,L&hC,L 13
Ä  (A.20) 
e%C,,L = ÁC,ÂC ∙ C,ÂCeC,LÄ +  C,Â%C,LÄ Ä  (A.21) 
%C,,LeC,,L = -0C,ÂC,ÂC 1 ∙ 0 &eC,L&%C,L13
Ä  (A.22) 
gC,L = gtC ∙ 0&gC,L&%C,L1
·Ï (A.23) 
Regional Demand 
%C,L = , %C,,L + , ¯r%C,8,L + ¯%C,L + ¯f%C,L + ¯rC,L8  (A.24) 
Total Production 
®C,L = %C,L + gC,L  (A.25) 
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Households and other Domestic Institutions  
,1 + L µL· − 11 − A
ù
L¼©  (A.26) 
µLµLä =  &µL ∙ 1 + &µLä ∙ 1 + ¶ú
·û (A.27) 
  HL = JHL + HL   (A.28) 
JHL1 + ¶L = JHLä + , ±'¶88 ∙ [; + ^¶; ∙ , ,L ∙ 7L+ , , %d8,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó8 + , %f8 ∙8 &µL + , %gh88∙ ­L − , , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,8,L8¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó  
(A.29) 
                      HL1 + ¶L = HLä + ±¥ÑÇCÑ\F ∙ ¶¾C,L ∙ , CC − , d88  (A.30) 
DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L = ±¥ÑÇCÑ\E ∙ 7L ∙ , CC + ±¥ÑÇCÑ\F ∙ ¶¾C,L ∙ , CC + ±¥ÑÇCÑ\8 ∙ ¶ℎC,L , rCC+ , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L +¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó &µL ∙ %f¥ÑÇCÑ\ + ­L ∙ %gh¥ÑÇCÑ\ (A.31) 
%d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L = &µL ∙ %dttttttt¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó  (A.32) 
d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L = ¡¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∙ DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L (A.33) 
¯rC,8,L = C,8 ¸ ∙ 0&µC,L&¯C,L1
¸ ∙ µL  (A.34) 
¯rC,8,L = ÁC,8 ∙ C,88 ∙ ¯r%C,8,LÄ + C,88Ã ∙ ¯rhC,8,LÄ   Ä  (A.35) 
¯r%C,8,L¯rhC,8,L = -0 C,88C,88Ã1 ∙ 0&hC,L&%C,L 13
Ä  (A.36) 
Government  
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èL = , ¯fC,L ∙ &¯C,L + fdtttttttC + , %f¥ÑÇCÑ\,L ∙¥ÑÇCÑ\ &µL
− Ð±Çy ∙ , ¶¾C,L ∙ C,LC + ±Ç8 ∙ , ¶ℎC,L ∙ rC,LC + , ehC,LC
+ , ±'¶88 ∙ [; + ^¶; ∙ , ,L ∙ 7L   + gtttt ∙ ­L1 
(A.37) 
¯fC,L = ÁCÇ ∙ CÇ ∙ ¯f%C,LÄ + CÇÃ ∙ ¯fhC,LÄ   Ä  (A.38) 
¯f%C,L¯fhC,L = -0 C
ÇCÇÃ1 ∙ 0&hC,L&%C,L 13
Ä  (A.39) 
Investment Demand  
¯C,L = , hC, ∙ ,L (A.40) 
¯C,L = ÁCÂ ∙ CÔÂÃ ∙ ¯hC,LÄ + CÔÂC ∙ ¯e%C,LÄ   Ä  (A.41) 
¯hC,L¯e%C,L = v°C
ÔÂÃCÔÂC³ ∙ 0&e%C,L&hC,L 1w
Ä  (A.42) 
¯e%C,L = ÁCÂC ∙ CÔÂC ∙ ¯eC,LÄ + CÔÂ ∙ ¯%C,LÄ   Ä  (A.43) 
¯%C,L¯eC,L = v°C
ÔÂCÔÂC ³ ∙ 0 &eC,L&%C,L1w
Ä  (A.44) 
Time path of investment  
 C,L = eC,L  
ü
ýþ1 − aa − '¾ + £2   
eC,LC,L −  Ù¢BeC,LC,L 
 (A.45) 
eLL = Ù + 1£ ∙  ~C,L&¾L − 1 − aa − '¾ (A.46) 
~C,L = ~C,L¶L +  − %C,Ly  (A.47) 
90 
 
ãjL =  £2  jL −  ÙBjL ;  and  jL = eLL  (A.48) 
%C,Ly = ¶¾L − &¾L - eC,LC,L3
B ãLe   (A.49) 
Factors accumulation  
dC,Lä = 1 −  ∙ dC,L + eC,L  (A.50) 
dC,Lä = °1 + 0 − [./L − ./ t +   -./   7L[¡^L¢ − ./ 0 7[¡^131³ ∙ dC,L  (A.51) 
C,L = dC,L  (A.52) 
dL ∙ 1 − L = , ,L  (A.53) 
Indirect taxes and subsidies  
eºC,L = a'kjC ∙ ®C,L ∙ &®C,L (A.54) 
eh,L = , h® ∙ hC,,L ∙ &hC,LC  (A.55) 
d´ºdDC,L = d´ºC ∙ ®C,L ∙ &®C,L (A.56) 
Total demand for import and current account  
hC,L = , eC,,L + , hC,,L + , ¯rhC,8,L8 + ¯fhC,L + ¯eC,L + ¯hC,L  (A.57) 
ºL = , hC,LC ∙ &hC,L − , gC,L ∙ &gC,LC + ­L ∙ Ð , %ghttttttt¥ÑÇCÑ\¥ÑÇCÑ\ +  gttttÒ (A.58) 
Assets  
C,L = ~C,L ∙ C,L  (A.59) 
èLä = 1 + ¶ − é ∙ èL + ºL  (A.60) 
&xø>Lä ∙ fèLä = 1 + ¶ − éx +  &[Lä&[L − 1¢ ∙ fèL ∙ &xø>L + èL  (A.61) 
91 
 
Steady State conditions  
dC,G = eC,G  (A.62) 
%C,Gy = ~C,G¶G +  (A.63) 
èG = − ¶ − éx +  &[Lä&[L − 1¢ ∙ &xø>G ∙ fèG  (A.64) 
ºG = −¶ − é ∙ èG  (A.65) 
 
JHG ∙ ¶G = , ±'¶88 ∙ [; + ^¶; ∙ , ,G ∙ 7G + , , %d8,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,G¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó8+ , %f8 ∙8 &µG + , %gh88 ∙ ­G − , , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,8,G8¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó  
(A.66) 
                      HL ∙ ¶G = ±¥ÑÇCÑ\F ∙ ¶¾C,L ∙ , CC − , d8,G8  (A.67) 
 
In order to produce short-run results, we have that  dC,L¼ = dC,L¼© (A.68) 
d¼ = dL¼© (A.69) 
fèL¼ = fèL¼© (A.70) 
èL¼ = èL¼© (A.71) 
For FL2 equation (A.33) disappear if dngins=h. We also add:  
 
 
HL = , C,L + &xø>'+1 ∙ fèL + èLC   
 
(A.72) 
 
HL1 + ¶L = HLä + Πç − °, C,L +C èL − ºL³ (A.73) 
 
92 
 
In order to run the myopic model from the consumption side, equations 
(A.26) and (A.27) are substitute with the following: 
 
µL = , DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∈ ÌÎ − , d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L¥ÑÇCÑ\ ∈ ÌÎ − r®L− , , %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,8,L8¥ÑÇCÑ\  
 
(A.74) 
 
To obtain the path of investment equations (A.46 – A.49) disappear and 
we introduce: eC,L = > ∙ `dC,L∗ − dC,Lb +  ∙ dC,L (A.75) 
dC,∗ =  <,L= ∙ y ∙ &D,L[¾L¢
À ∙ D,L (A.76) 
Alternatively we can use the following 
 
eC,LdC,L =  ∙ ¶¾C,L[¾LÂ  (A.77) 
Where > equal 0.5 in (A.75) and 2 in (A.77) 
 
 
 
Glossary 
 
i,j                    the set of goods or industries 
ins                               the set of institutions 
dins ⊂ ^/        the set of domestic institutions 
dngins ⊂ ±^/         the set of non government institutions 
h ⊂ ±/x^/   the set of households 
 Prices  &®C,L  output price &DC,L value added price &%C,L regional price &¯C,L  commodity price &e%C,L  national commodity price (regional + ROI) &eC,L ROI price  ¶¾C,L  rate of return to capital 7L  unified nominal wage 
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7L  after tax wage &¾L  capital good price ´µL  user cost of capital ~C,L shadow price of capital &µL  aggregate consumption price &fø>L  aggregate price of Government consumption goods ­L exchange rate [fixed] 
  
Endogenous 
Variables 
 
®C,L total output %C,L  Regional supply hC,L  total import gC,L  total export (interregional + international) DC,L  value added C,L labour demand C,L  physical capital demand dC,L  capital stock dC,L  labour supply C,L  Total intermediate inputs %C,L  regional intermediate inputs hC,L  ROW intermediate inputs e%C,L  national intermediate inputs (REG+ROI) eC,L  ROI intermediate inputs ¯f%C,L  regional government expenditure ¯fhC,L  government expenditure( ROI+ROW) µL  aggregated household consumption ¯rC,8,L  total households consumption in sector i for h  ¯r%C,8,L  regional consumption in sector i for group h ¯rhC,8,L  import consumption in sector i for group h ¯C,L  total investment by sector of origin i ¯%C,L regional investment by sector of origin i ¯hC,L  ROW investment demand ¯e%C,L  national investment (REG+ROI) ¯eC,L ROI investment demand 
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e,L  investment by sector of destination j ,L  investment by destination j with adjustment cost L  regional unemployment rate %C,Ly  marginal net revenue of capital d¥ÑÇCÑ\,L  domestic non government saving DJf¥ÑÇCÑ\,L domestic non government income %d¥ÑÇCÑ\,¥ÑÇCÑ\Ó,L transfer among dngins r®L  total household tax ºL  current account balance d´ºdDL  production subsidies   
Exogenous 
variables  %ghtttttttL  remittance for dngins gttttL  remittance for the Government ¯fC,L  government expenditure  fdL  government saving ¶L  interest rate   
Elasticities  A constant elasticity of marginal utility  
  between labour and capital in sector j CI in Armington function ACØ of export with respect to term of trade ¤ of real wage with respect to unemployment rate   
Parameters  kC,²  Input-output coefficients for i used in j kO  share of value added on production y,N  shares in value added function in sector j C,ÂC,ÂÃ,Â,ÂC  shares parameters in CES function for intermediate goods C,ÔÂC,ÔÂÃ,ÔÂ,ÔÂC  shares parameters in CES function for investment goods C,88,8Ã shares parameters in CES function for households consumption  CÇ,ÇÃ  shares parameters in CES function for government consumption  
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ÁC,ÂÂ,ÂC  shift parameter in CES functions for intermediate goods ÁC shift parameter in CES function for households consumption 
goods ÁCÇ shift parameter in CES function for government consumption  a'kjC  business tax aC  rate of production subsidy h®C  rate of import tax hC, physical capital matrix ¡¥ÑÇCÑ\  rate of saving in institutions dngins ssce rate of social security paid by emploees sscer rate of social security paid by emploer ire rate of income tax  pure rate of consumer time preference 
bb rate of distortion or incentive to investment  rate of depreciation 
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Interconnection between trade deficit and Government deficit. 
In this section we consider the case of interconnection between the trade 
deficit and the Government deficit. We make the extreme hypothesis that 
the entire interregional and international trade deficit is the result of 
National and EU financial support respectively. This allows us to 
consider a simpler case than if a detailed regional balance of payments 
was available. Thus, interregional and international trade deficits provide 
resources for regional policy through financial assistance from the 
national Government and the EU (e.g. European Structural and Social 
Funds). We preserve a sectoral financial balance equilibrium so that the 
private sector is in full portfolio equilibrium. Essentially, we hypothesize 
that the only constraint on regional policy derives from the trade deficit. 
As we have mentioned elsewhere, such a constraint seems more 
appropriate for regions than those commonly applied in intertemporal 
models, where fiscal policy is endogenous because of the imposition of a 
borrowing constraint, e.g. the ratio of Government debt to GDP must be 
constant over time (see e.g. McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1992; Dissou, 
2002).  
In this section, we analyze the likely impact of an increase in 
interregional competitiveness but change the adjustment mechanism for 
the balance of payments. Full portfolio balance for the private sector is 
imposed, and the Government deficit equals the trade deficit through 
adjustment in Government expenditure. Then the resources available for 
regional policy will depend on the current account balance. Here, we do 
not impose any constraints on borrowing: any demand for credit is 
satisfied by an endogenous supply, or any request for capital inflow can 
be easily supplied by the interregional and international capital market. 
This kind of adjustment is also applied to the myopic model. As can be 
seen, we do not need to introduce artificial differences into our myopic 
model, such as fixing investment or making it passive (that is, equal to 
savings which are determined in turn as a fixed share of income) since 
the myopic model allows for a different treatment of investment which is 
very close to a Tobin’s q adjustment.  
We again simulate a 10% increase in interregional exports but, at this 
time, two components of aggregate demand are involved: interregional 
exports and Government expenditure. The former increases by 10% over 
time and the latter is determined endogenously. If the trade deficit 
increases, resources for regional policy increase as well. Indeed, the 
increase in interregional competitiveness may not be sufficient to provide 
overall current account improvement, thus more capital inflow will be 
devoted to regional policy. The percentage change variation from the 
base values of some key variables are reported on Table 3 below.  
In the short run, prices increase whilst in the long run we get Leontief 
results as prices return to their initial values. In fact, even though regional 
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policy is now endogenous, supply side effects are still neglected in these 
simulations.  
According to simulations seen in the preceding sections, in the long run 
the exogenous positive shift in interregional competitiveness outweighs 
the negative terms of trade effect occurring as a consequence of an 
increase in aggregate demand.  In this simulation instead, change in the 
whole current account is positive (5.89%), implying a negative trade 
balance. The main concern here is that, whilst interregional 
competitiveness rises, a positive change in Government expenditure 
increases the level of economic activity. This, in turn, requires a high 
level of imports to meet firm’s production needs due to the high 
propensity of regional economies such as Sardinia to import. So, even a 
potential improvement in the current account through a reduced 
interregional trade deficit (-4.78%) is totally offset by an increase in the 
international deficit (12.91%). Given, also, that capital inflow will always 
be available at regional level.  
Immediately we notice that, with respect to the simulations above 
where Government expenditure is fixed, the level of GRP is more than 
double for every period and for all labour market closures. In the LR we 
get a GRP variation of 1.91% in FL1 and 2.06 % in FL2 whilst here the 
percentage change in GRP is above the base year by 6.64%. This is 
related to a positive shift in the Government balance equation implying 
an increase in Government consumption which creates more output and 
increases imports to sustain production. This weakens the trade deficit as 
regional price increases contribute to producing more resources for 
regional policy. 
Increases in domestic prices immediately raise firms’ profit 
expectations and so investment, tempered to some extent by a higher 
replacement cost of capital. Contrary to the previous simulations (FL1 
and FL2) the impact on sectoral investment is somewhat different and we 
need to differentiate between labour market regimes. For regional 
bargaining and fixed real wage, of the three sectors, the Service sector 
receives a permanent benefit. This sector is also the only one where 
output and investment increase in the short run. With respect to the 
previous exercise, we need to consider the regional Government’s high 
propensity to consume services which raises its domestic prices relatively 
more than the other sectors, encouraging firms’ investment. For national 
bargaining, all three sectors experience a permanent increase in 
investment, whereas, in the short run, investment rises more in the 
service sector than in the primary and manufacturing sectors.   
Price changes and the rate of intertemporal substitution will affect the 
dynamic path of real wealth and consumption. From the figures presented 
in Table 3, we see that consumption changes become positive in the long 
run, however in the initial period, consumption is below the benchmark 
equilibrium. Of course, period by period, as the increase in price is 
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gradually dampened down by the increase in supply, consumption will 
rise from the initial fall moving to its long run steady state (4.93%). 
There are no significant differences in the direction of the effect in the 
myopic and intertemporal models. The main differences are in the short 
run impact on sectoral output and investment and on trade. These are 
especially the results of the implication of the sectoral fixity capacity that 
has produced some differences in the short run response between the two 
models. With regard to the impact on output, we see that in the MYP the 
Primary sector experiences the greatest impact, thereby becoming the 
most profitable sector, since firms are investing more in Primary than 
Manufacturing and Services. It is here that we see a greater relative 
increase in the return to capital. In the FL model, the Service sector 
benefits more than the others from an increase in interregional 
competitiveness. 
 
Table 3 - Forward-looking and myopic models. The short-run and long-
run impact of 10% increase in interregional export. Interconnection 
between trade deficit and government deficit. 
 
Long-Run Long-Run
RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW RB NB FRW RB=NB=FRW
GRP Factor Cost 0.198 1.153 0.225 6.643 0.059 0.268 0.065 6.643
Consumer Price Index 4.018 4.133 4.080 0.000 1.410 0.989 1.397 0.000
Unemployment Rate -3.001 -17.512 -3.412 0.000 -0.896 -4.069 -0.990 0.000
Total Employment 0.750 4.378 0.853 6.638 0.224 1.017 0.247 6.638
Nominal Wage 4.124 0.000 4.080 0.000 1.440 0.000 1.397 0.000
Real Wage 0.101 -3.969 0.000 0.000 0.030 -0.979 0.000 0.000
Capital Good Price 4.137 4.291 4.202 0.000 1.385 0.944 1.371 0.000
Foreign Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.892
Government Debt -4.501 -4.788 -4.574 5.893 -1.363 -0.863 -1.349 5.892
Labour Supply 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.638 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.638
Households Cons -1.061 -1.223 -1.149 4.931 0.117 0.015 0.114 4.931
Households Saving 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.381 3.686 2.419 5.634
Financial Wealth 4.944 6.380 5.081 6.645 0.367 0.568 0.373 6.645
Non Financial Wealth 4.851 4.722 4.858 4.743 2.792 3.503 2.846 4.743
Total Wealth 4.861 4.886 4.880 4.931 2.552 3.213 2.601 4.931
Gov. Expenditure 10.477 17.172 10.918 9.938 0.557 0.699 0.561 9.938
Value of Firm 4.944 6.380 5.081 6.645 0.367 0.568 0.373 6.645
Current Account ROI+ROW 15.317 21.539 15.831 5.893 1.694 1.041 1.675 5.893
Current Account ROI 12.155 20.014 12.895 -4.781 -8.383 -9.702 -8.423 -4.781
Current Account ROW 17.398 22.542 17.762 12.916 8.326 8.110 8.319 12.916
Investment 3.545 10.387 3.916 6.621 0.917 2.777 0.972 6.621
Value Added
Prymary -0.535 2.395 -0.492 7.148 0.838 1.786 0.866 7.148
Manufacturing -0.281 2.232 -0.221 6.164 0.270 1.014 0.292 6.164
Service 0.707 2.926 0.776 6.720 0.084 0.525 0.097 6.720
Interregional export
Prymary 3.739 5.945 3.746 10.000 6.000 6.934 6.028 10.000
Manufacturing 2.068 2.691 1.988 10.000 5.694 6.400 5.715 10.000
Service -1.001 -1.688 -1.175 10.000 6.609 7.849 6.646 10.000
International exports
Prymary -5.692 -3.687 -5.686 0.000 -3.637 -2.787 -3.611 0.000
Manufacturing -7.211 -6.644 -7.284 0.000 -3.915 -3.273 -3.896 0.000
Service -10.001 -10.626 -10.159 0.000 -3.082 -1.955 -3.049 0.000
Investment demand
Prymary -2.776 6.395 -2.422 7.148 3.829 7.078 4.152 7.148
Manufacturing -1.725 6.158 -1.349 6.164 1.459 4.276 1.707 6.164
Service 5.560 11.929 5.932 6.720 0.551 2.029 0.470 6.720
Shadow Price of Capital
Prymary 3.568 5.598 3.706 0.000 5.119 7.881 5.201 0.000
Manufacturing 3.791 5.521 3.932 0.000 2.767 5.008 2.833 0.000
Service 5.202 6.565 5.339 0.000 1.885 2.784 1.911 0.000
Value Added Price
Prymary 3.611 2.298 3.609 0.000 2.237 1.699 2.221 0.000
Manufacturing 3.693 3.456 3.741 0.000 1.848 1.533 1.838 0.000
Service 5.541 5.934 5.637 0.000 1.601 1.006 1.583 0.000
Short-Run Short-Run
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Output increases more in this sector where firms are willing to invest 
more given that the real shadow price of capital experiences the greatest 
change. Furthermore, the huge increase in Government expenditure in FL 
has the effect of increasing output in the Service sector since almost 75% 
of total Government consumption is focused on this sector. In contrast, in 
the MYP model the increase in Government expenditure is not enough to 
generate the highest increase in Services; the Primary sector is the 
greatest beneficiary.  
 
 
Figure 9 
Government Expenditure and trade deficit for MYP and FL (National 
Bargaining) 
 
 
When considering the impact on trade, the current account, and 
consequently the behaviour of Government expenditure, have a different 
transitional pathway as we show with the aid of Figure 9. This gives the 
time path of adjustment of Government expenditure and the trade deficit 
for FL and MYP where, for simplicity, only national bargaining is 
considered. We note that the trade deficit in FL increases immediately 
and then gradually decreases, maintaining a positive change in all 
periods. So Government expenditure immediately rises in the SR then 
gradually diminishes until it settles at its LR steady state (9.94%). In the 
MYP, the trade deficit gradually increases in each period and so does 
Government expenditure.  In both models, FL and MYP, prices increase 
in the short run, so limiting the real increase in interregional exports and 
contributing to the substitution effect lowering international exports. But 
this increase in domestic prices has a limited effect on trade under MYP 
where the total trade deficit rise to 1.04%, and a significant effect under 
FL where the trade deficit rises steeply to 21.54%. Such differences are 
the result of different impacts on regional prices in the two models. This 
means that in this simulation, the model response to factor constraints is 
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somewhat different, making the forward-looking model more sensitive to 
sectoral fixity capacity than the myopic model. This can be seen by 
comparing the increase in value added price for both models. 
 
Government borrowing constraint. 
As we have seen in FL2, since savings and investment are separately 
determined, the equilibrium condition is obtained through foreign 
savings. These enter into the household consumption decision allowing 
us to avoid fiscal policy given that are there no borrowing constraints 
(the same has been done in Devarajan and Go, 1994). However, it is also 
quite common in intertemporal CGE models to introduce fiscal closures 
that put some constraint on Government debt. The implication of such a 
constraint is based on the sustainability of the Government deficit: if the 
Government is running a budget deficit today, it must run an appropriate 
budget surplus in the future. To guarantee that the intertemporal budget 
constraint holds at every point in time one may assume, for example, that 
the Government levies taxes in each period that are equal to the value of 
interest payments on the outstanding debt (see e.g. McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 1994, 1998). In this case, it seems plausible to use a non-
distortionary lump sum tax. One may also think about other financial 
closures, such as those requiring the ratio of Government debt to GDP to 
be constant over time (see e.g. McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1994, 1998; 
Dissou, 2002). To ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint holds, 
we may endogenize fiscal policy through adjustment in Government 
consumption or lump sum taxes or transfers. Even in this case, the easiest 
way is to introduce a non-distortionary adjustment. For instance, an 
endogenous adjustment in the tax rate that significantly changes the real 
consumption wage by producing supply side effects might be unwelcome 
since it would complicate the interpretation of the main policy 
implemented. 
In this section we again simulate a 10% increase in interregional 
exports, but this time introducing some endogenous fiscal policy 
adjustment. We have already discussed the sustainability of fiscal deficit 
and the related regional inconsistency of the no-Ponzi games 
requirement. In the light of this, we may introduce an upper limit for 
outstanding Government debt, maintaining the ratio of debt to GDP 
constant, period by period, and endogenising either Government 
spending or transfers to household. The former would also represent an 
additional counterfactual to be compared with the previous one, where 
Government spending was endogenous to ensure compliance with the 
Government budget constraint.  
As in both simulations we avoid supply side effects, a type of 
adjustment already explained in the other sections. What we would 
expect to be different is the ultimate impact that occurs as a result of a 
change in the free variables.  When Government expenditure is 
endogenous a shift in the Government budget occurs producing more 
 resources for regional policy and so increasing Government 
consumption, whilst a shift in the household budget arises since human 
wealth increases as a result of an increase in transfers to
both cases, the change in Government expenditure or transfers will be 
enough to accommodate the imposed constraint. 
The charts below draw up the paths of Government expenditure and 
transfer. Both variables increase over time and, in the long run, they 
reach approximately the same proportionate change: 11.38% for 
Government expenditure and 11.93% for transfers. However t
macroeconomic impact is different in magnitude. For passive 
Government expenditure, the change in real GRP in the long run is 
7.10% whilst for passive transfers the real GRP, change is about 4.91%. 
Thus there is an asymmetric effect from endogenous fi
change in Government consumption has a multiplier effect upon 
equilibrium output greater than that of a lump sum transfer. This is 
happening because households have a higher propensity to import than 
the Government.  
 
 
The impact of 10% increase in interregional export on government 
consumption (a) and transfers (b)
 
                        (a)                                                       (b)
 
One thing which seems worthy of note is the behaviour of households’ 
financial wealth. In both simulations, financial wealth decreases in the 
short run, then it gradually rises, assuming positive change, until it settles 
at its long run equilibrium.  In the short run, although firm values are 
increasing, the rise in Government de
for the rise in external debt. Some point after the shock, the increase in 
competitiveness accompanied by an expansive fiscal policy yields to an 
opposite situation where the increase of the external debt is totally offse
by the rise in value of firms and Government debt. 
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Figure 11 
Path of the assets hold by household 
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